


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22 November 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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22 November 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI CITED AS U.S. ATTEMPT TO GAIN SUPERIORITY

LD041641 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Discussion on SDI presented by unidentified moderator, with Doctor of Sciences (Grigoriy Khalkin), disarmament expert Lev Semeyko, and PRAVDA correspondent Tomas Kolesnichenko; place not given -- live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] There was the time when Britain was the major sea power and ruled the world; when the United States dominated in the air it led the free world. Now the leader will be the one who dominates in space. This has been said not by an advocate of the Strategic Defense Initiative of the eighties, but by Lyndon Johnson back in 1964. Since then Washington's space policy has remained unchanged. It has only become more menacing by nature.

In this program we will talk about "star wars" and the emergence of the concept. Taking part in the talk are Doctor of Sciences (Grigoriy Khalkin), an expert on arms and disarmament Lev Semeyko, and a correspondent of the daily PRAVDA, Tomas Kolesnichenko.

In March 1983 President Reagan declared his intention to do away with the nuclear arms race by creating a space shield. But specialists have maintained that space weapons will become an integral part of the strike nuclear potential. So is the Strategic Defense Initiative an attempt to end the nuclear arms race or is it only a follow-up to it? Lev Semeyko answers.

[Semeyko in Russian with superimposed English translation] The atomic bomb was a catalyst of the gigantic arms race that subsequently got underway. The United States was first to create strategic bombers, nuclear powered submarines, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles and cruise missiles. The Soviet Union was second in designing similar systems. Washington has always been the initiator of the arms race. Its political goal has been to achieve strategic superiority while the USSR has suggested abandoning new weapons ever since the nuclear bomb was created. And yet, whenever the United States has not met the Soviet Union halfway the USSR has had to create similar means. And for 15 years now experts have been talking about the existing parity. However, some circles in the United States face the following dilemma: Either to try to take the lead again by creating new weapons or to learn to live in conditions of such a parity. We know from history that attempts to gain superiority have failed. Kissinger once quite aptly remarked that if Washington had known the consequences of the creation of MIRV's, it would not have started working on them. This remark is indicative of the American politicians' way of thinking. An enticing technical idea appears, a weapon is designed and deployed, countermeasures follow, all this increases the nuclear threat, and then comes a belated enlightenment for some people. But no matter how paradoxical it may seem the tempting idea to take the lead still exists. But how can a lead be achieved? Only by using outer space.

[Announcer] From the onset of the space era Washington has sought to adopt space technology to military needs. However, this technology was regarded as secondary in significance. Top priority in plans to achieve military superiority has always been given to the nuclear bomb and its delivery vehicles. And suddenly, there is the Strategic Defense Initiative. Or maybe not so suddenly. Now (Grigoriy Khalkin) to answer.

[Khalkin] To me SDI is just one qualitative step in the development of space technology designed for use (?for) military purposes. Let's remember the very first years of American space program. A great number of concepts and ideas were put forward by different (?persons). The idea was any new developments in space program should be primarily put into military (?field.)

[Announcer] Military satellites have been in space for long. Why, then, do we say that the demilitarization of space started in the eighties rather than in the sixties? Have there been attempts to deploy weapons in space before? (Grigoriy Khalkin) answers.

[Khalkin] There were ideas of how to make up weapon systems to be used in space. I remember the project [words indistinct]. I remember the idea of making military bases on the moon and to launch missiles from the moon to earth. These were only ideas, but they were somehow supported by research and development projects (?of) different [word indistinct]. The ideas -- I stress it -- the ideas to use space for military purposes were expressed on a (?really very) large scale.

[Announcer] The tasks of creating a space weapon, formulated back in 1946 in the Rand project, have been carried out throughout the space era and have found their expression in the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Now (Grigoriy Khalkin) describes what has been accomplished as part of this program.

[Khalkin] I cannot try to estimate the SDI (?exists), but this attack system was [word indistinct]. The technology for ABM or ballistic missile defense is already here. They say that they have, you know, put it in conservation but the system is here and this is the basis, the whole purpose. All the space technology which may be used for military purposes has an organizational (?status). I mean the unified or just all armed forces Space Command. Now, space shuttle, what is it? Of course, it's means of transportation, but it's the government and the Ministry of Defense [as heard] who decide how to load this means of transportation and we were already witnessing two top secret flights and we can (?see) what actually they did there. We know fragmentary information about just [words indistinct] in space, methods of searching the targets in space. Just different experiments. Now the American Ministry of Defense is right on the verge of changing its entire doctrine, and this military doctrine will incorporate the idea of using space not only as they (?did it previously) for support of military activities on the earth, but it will incorporate space as a part of battlefields of the future and the space (?essence) will be the elements of strategic potential of United States.

[Announcer] The Strategic Defense Initiative is based on a large-scale antimissile defense system with space-based elements. The debates on the antimissile defense program, the prototype of the Strategic Defense Initiative project, took place at the end of the sixties when their advocates boosted space system varieties for these

purposes. However, commonsense prevailed then. Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union set limits to antimissile defense systems. The two countries agreed that large-scale antimissile defense is as destabilizing as defensive nuclear weapons. So is there a new element in the Strategic Defense Initiative? Tomas Kolesnichenko answers.

[Kolesnichenko in Russian with superimposed English translation] From the viewpoint of its wording the program was a new step, in the sense that qualitatively new systems of strike weapons are presented as a panacea. I was at a news conference in Moscow on 22 October and it was said there that the conclusion of the temporary SALT I agreement and SALT II treaty became possible because the antimissile defense systems of the sides were limited. The antimissile defense accord says that effective measures on limiting antimissile defense systems are a substantial factor in containing the offensive strategic arms race. At that time only antimissile defense on land was considered. Space-based antimissile defense was not an issue.

The situation has changed. The United States has declared its intention to create a global antimissile defense system with space-based elements. Its goal is to guarantee the United States capability of delivering the first strike against the Soviet Union with impunity and by creating an antimissile defense system deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to retaliate. In these conditions to agree for some limitation and all the more so for strategic offensive arms reduction without an agreement on banning strike space weapons means to neglect the Soviet Union's security. The USSR will never go for that. The main issue of today is to ban strike space weapons.

[Announcer] In 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson said that the one who'll dominate in space will rule the world. And 20 years after that the Reagan administration has decided to try and achieve this superiority. But this has nothing in common with the searches for peace and stability.

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CSO: 5200/1126

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW HITS WEINBERGER INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH PAPER

PM061527 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Yu. Bandura "Rejoinder" under the "Themes of the Day" rubric: "Weinberger's Personal Enemy"]

[Text] In an interview in the French weekly L'EXPRESS the U.S. secretary of defense confirmed: "There can be no question" of abandonment of the "star wars" program by the United States. To justify this rigid stance, the "external enemy" was cited as usual: "If the Russians develop [razrabotayut] space weapons first, "an extremely dangerous situation will take shape in the world."

Judging from the text of the interview, however, C. Weinberger's real enemy is not the "Russians," but his own tongue. Because in attributing insidious intentions to the Soviet Union, the Pentagon chief has in fact revealed Washington's true aims connected with the "star wars" program.

On his own admission the development [razrabotka] and launching into near-earth orbit of space strike weapons are designed to "nullify the deterrent nuclear facilities" of a potential enemy. If this task succeeds, the defense secretary stresses, "nothing can prevent the delivery of a first nuclear strike" against an enemy. Those premises lead logically to Weinberger's conclusion: "It is vitally important that we develop [razrabotai] such systems (of space strike armaments -- Yu. B.) first."

Verily, "my tongue is my own enemy." These revelations also make clear yet again the reasons why Washington is in such haste in the arms race for "star wars" and why it refuses to assume a commitment not to be first to use nuclear weapons.

Citing "those perfidious Russians" changes nothing. In the first place, because the Soviet Union not only has no intention of being first in the space arms race, but also proposes preventing that race altogether before it is too late. And in the second place, because it assumed a commitment long ago not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and so does not need space arms intended, as the Pentagon chief himself acknowledges, for delivering a "successful first strike."

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CSO: 5200/1126

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS HITS FRG'S STRAUSS' SUPPORT OF SDI

LD070047 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 6 Nov 85

["Advocate of the 'Star Wars'"]---TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 6 TASS--By TASS commentator Lev Aksenov.

Franz-Josef Strauss, prime minister of West Germany's Bavaria land, leader of the Christian-Social Union (CSU), assessed the U.S. Administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative" as "a major project" to the realization of which "the Europeans have been invited". Speaking in an interview to the West German television, Franz-Josef Strauss at the same time spoke very sceptically about the "Eureka" project drafted by a number of Western European nations, describing it as only a "term" which still had to be filled with content.

The role of an advocate of the "star wars" program assumed by Franz-Josef Strauss can hardly come as a surprise to anyone. Throughout his career this Bavarian politician always followed the principle -- "What is good for the military-industrial complex is good for the Federal Republic of Germany." It is not an accident that Bavaria, where the CSU party has been in power for decades, is a veritable "arms forgery" [as received] the region where major West German arms-producing companies are based.

It is not accidental either that the CSU leader chose precisely this time for an "advertisement" for the American "star wars" doctrine.

These days a meeting of heads of diplomatic services, and science ministers from 18 Western European countries is in progress in Hannover. They discuss prospects for the "Eureka" project. Franz-Josef Strauss regarded it as a potential "threat to the 'Strategic Defense Initiative'", for "Eureka" may deflect a portion of the scientific and technological potential from the space militarization program that is being imposed by the United States on its allies. No one has ever heard of a case when the prime minister of Bavaria failed to support Washington's line on any issue. Today, too, having discarded all methods of diplomacy, he wants to bring pressure to bear on those "obstinate guys" from Western Europe who do not want to join in the American space adventure unconditionally.

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CSO: 5200/1126

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW COMMENT ON 5 NOVEMBER HANOVER MEETING ON EUREKA

TV Report

LD052153 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 5 Nov 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by V. Korzin]

[Text] Representatives of 18 countries have gathered today in Hanover, the capital of Lower Saxony in the FRG, to discuss the prospects for development of the Eureka project. This is the second such conference, which is deciding the scope of West European countries' interstate programs on the accelerated development of modern technology.

Western Europe is striving to play an independent role in the world. However, it quite often turns out that the United States allocates its friends and allies a secondary place. In order to resist this, to have the opportunity to speak on equal terms, and, as one paper wrote, not to pick up crumbs from the master's table but to play the role of equal partner, there arose the idea of uniting efforts in the most important directions of science and technology.

Recently FRG Foreign Minister Genscher described Eureka as a manifestation of consciousness and self-assertiveness by Western Europeans. Western Europe, he said, should not have to rely on using licenses from other countries.

At the 2-day conference in Hanover it is proposed that organizational issues be decided and that regulations of the program be adopted. However, the main component on which the fate of the project depends is financing. Originally it was anticipated that the basic funds to subsidize scientific research and developmental work would come from interested firms and owners. However, it has become clear that this is far from enough. State subsidies are necessary. For example, the British Department of Trade and Industry is planning to address a request to the Exchequer for approval to set up a special fund to finance the Eureka project. This fund will exist, it is reported, for all unforeseen events. There is still a great deal, as yet unforeseen, in this matter. Although general outlines have been made of the approximate directions of joint work, such as robot technology, information science, communications technology, biotechnology and laser technology, each country has, first and foremost, its own interests in mind.

The French Government acted as the initiator of the Eureka project by putting the project forward as an alternative to Reagan's "star wars" program. However, certain circles in Western European countries, namely Britain and the FRG, are linked with

the military-industrial monopoly and would like to direct technological cooperation on the Eureka project onto a military course, and turn the project itself into a kind of adjunct to the U.S. so-called Strategic Defense Initiative.

This, of course, cannot fail to affect the work of the conference which opened in Hanover today. Washington's promises of large profits for those who take part in developing the "star wars" program are, of course, doing their job. For the peoples of Europe, the West German paper UNSERE ZEIT writes in this connection, it is not a matter of indifference which direction cooperation on the Eureka project develops, and whether it will serve the well-being of peoples or whether it will serve preparations for a new war.

TASS on Communique

LD061919 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 6 Nov 85

[Text] Hanover, November 6 TASS -- By TASS special correspondents Albert Balebanov, Vyacheslav Bondarev and Vladimir Serov.

The second intergovernmental conference on the Eureka project came to a close here today with the passing of two final documents -- a communique and a declaration of principles of cooperation between European countries in high technology.

Ministers for foreign affairs and scientific research from 18 West European countries and representatives of the European Economic Community took part in the conference.

The declaration, setting forth the principles, objectives and major directions of cooperation should facilitate the enhanced effectiveness and competitiveness of the Western European economy on the world market. The provision that Eureka projects will serve civilian purposes is an important element of the declaration.

The conferees agreed to concentrate the efforts of their countries and private companies at the initial stage on the development of advanced technologies in the following areas: informatics and communications, robotics, development of new materials, industrial technology, biotechnology, study of the ocean, lasers, environmental protection and transport.

Ten specific projects were approved, including those involving the development of industrial lasers, micro-computers for education and home use, the establishment of a European network of research centres, study of the degree of pollution of the troposphere above Europe.

The third intergovernmental conference on the Eureka project will be held in London in May next year.

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CSO: 5200/1126

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENT ON NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF SDI

LD051654 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Remarks by an unidentified moderator; Dr Grigoriy Khozin, not further identified; Tomas Kolesnichenko, PRAVDA correspondent; Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy, NEW TIMES correspondent; and Viktor Israelyan, leader of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva disarmament talks]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] It was March 1983 when President Reagan officially proclaimed his Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI. President Reagan made his Strategic Defense Initiative program public when it was no longer possible to keep under cover the extensive work being done on space weapons. Moreover, some scientists, and notably Edward Teller, were assuring the President that the country was on the threshold of a breakthrough in the technology of offensive weapons. Other components needed for the militarization of space were already available. Grigoriy Khozin said:

[Begin Khozin in English] They are not speaking only about interceptional warheads. They are speaking of making up weapon systems to be used in space and from space in relation to the earth. This is the idea of SDI. It has very long historical roots in the American space program. What we should stress once more, that the Strategic Defense Initiative is dangerous for the entire humankind, not only because it is really a high-level technological endeavor and it is a very, very wide research program designed to make up weapons. But the major danger is that it receives highest political and military priority in the activity of this administration. [end recording]

[Announcer] There is one thing that both the advocates and opponents of the SDI in the United States agree on: No such technology exists which could offer a 100 percent defense from a nuclear strike. Advocates of the program maintain that nor is there any need for this. It is enough to have the ability to destroy those warheads of the enemy that survive America's first strike. Is that really possible? Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy has this to say on the subject:

[Read by announcer] Well, the critics of the program point out that all the numerous and complex components of the system -- several groups of anti-missile weapons, land and space based, super-computers, satellites, and ground warning and tracking bases -- have to be put together without a single test in combat conditions. And that's practically impossible. Another weakness of the Strategic Defense Initiative is that simple countermeasures can be used to foil it. For instance against the possible use of lasers, it's sufficient to increase the thermal protection of an inter-continental ballistic missile or cause it to rotate, or again, use low trajectories or simply

increase the number of carriers. And the cost of the deployment of the antimissile defense of the Strategic Defense Initiative is also awesome: \$1 trillion, while the countermeasures would cost much less. The Strategic Defense Initiative program also requires a parallel effective antimissile defense system for destroying low-flying missiles, such as cruise missiles and that, according to James Schlesinger would cost another \$50 billion a year.

[Announcer] But despite the vast scale of the work, the American Administration insists that the SDI is only a program of scientific research and it could stop at that. But the administration proposes to spend \$70 billion -- some say even \$90 billion -- over the next 10 years on this program. The Manhattan Project which produced the nuclear bomb cost \$15 billion. So it seems incredible that the administration will, as it tries to assure the world, stop short of deploying the new system. All that money allowed to go down the drain. It is no longer possible to believe Washington when it maintains that things have gone no further than research. Grigoriy Khozin put it this way:

[Begin Khozin recording in English] Representatives of administration, especially of Ministry of Defense say: We are doing research. Okay, we say, you are doing the research: But how can they qualify the research? How far did you go with this research? I may say that the American side went in the research designed to make up new means of destruction to be used in space rather fast and they are close to implementation of some of the ideas into real, maybe experimental, but still into real hardware which will be a danger for the rest of the world, and primarily for the Soviet Union. [end recording]

[Announcer] All this work is jeopardizing one of the most important treaties between the USSR and the United States, the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems. Tomas Kolesnichenko says:

[Begin Kolesnichenko recording in Russian with English translation] In an effort to calm the American public and provide a logical reason for its actions the Reagan administration is trying to revise the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and is offering its own interpretation of Document D. Washington is also trying to persuade the public that the Soviet Union is far ahead in the development of space weapons and that it has been violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems for a long time. But that's not true. One can only wonder over the primitive ways of American propaganda tactics. Every time the United States reaches a critical stage in the development of new weapons it brings out the same old lie: The United States is allegedly lagging behind and the Soviet Union has outstripped it.

[Announcer] It was not the Soviet Union but the American Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, who stated bluntly that if the research showed that it was possible to develop a new defense system which included space-based elements then it would be necessary to get around the ABM Treaty and revise it. Back in February of this year the Soviet Embassy pointed out in a note to the U.S. State Department that the United States had long ago sought to wreck the 1972 treaty, which is regarded as an obstacle by those politicians who seek the militarization of space in order to win a first-strike potential. Tests to this end are already being made, as during the flight of the Discovery in June.

The Soviet Union has warned that if work on the SDI continues in this vein it will be compelled to take countermeasures. The arms drive could slip out of control. Viktor Israelyan says:

[Begin Israelyan recording in Russian with English translation] The so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, known more commonly as the "star wars" program, could lead to irreparable consequences for mankind. That's the conclusion drawn in practically all countries. If work on the Strategic Defense Initiative goes ahead, the arms race would be stepped up at all levels, including that of strategic armaments. The Strategic Defense Initiative would increase greatly the military arsenals, it would change the structure of armed forces and greatly enhance the probability of war. The strategic stability would be undermined and the chances of a crisis situation arising greatly increased, as a result of any misinterpretation of situations, incidents or technical mishaps. It goes without saying that this would undermine all negotiations on the limitation of arms, both bilateral and multilateral. The work on the Strategic Defense Initiative is already having a negative effect on the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1126

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADIAN DEFENSE MINISTER, WEINBERGER DISCUSS SDI, NORAD

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 11 Oct 85 p A20

[Article by Jeff Sallot: "Weinberger Sees No Stumbling Blocks In NORAD Renewal"]

[Text] No problems are expected in renewing the Canada-U.S. aerospace defence alliance for another five years, U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger said yesterday after meeting Defence Minister Erik Nielsen.

Some critics of Washington's strategic defence initiative have said there is a danger that the continental alliance could become part of a U.S. strategy for fighting a nuclear war, so Ottawa should clarify its own strategic interests before renewing the agreement.

Mr. Weinberger also said the United States is looking for the help and expertise of private Canadian companies in the SDI research program, commonly known as Star Wars.

Last Month, Ottawa turned down an invitation to participate in a government-to-government arrangement with Washington on SDI research, though Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said Canadian high-technology companies are free to bid for contracts.

The North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement, which expires next March, and the controversial five-year SDI program were among topics discussed by Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Nielsen and associate defence minister Harvie Andre.

NORAD is a "very vital agreement" and important bilateral relationships grow out of it, Mr. Weinberger said. He did not elaborate during brief comments to reporters.

NORAD, originally intended to protect North America from possible Soviet bomber attack in the 1950s, is seen by many Western military strategists and arms control experts as assuming importance again if the United States ever used its SDI system to defend the continent from ballistic missiles.

That would give the bomber, and its more recent variation, the air-launched cruise missile, major significance.

Some Canadian critics of SDI, including the New democratic Party, have warned that NORAD might evolve to the point where it would become an integral part of an SDI strategy.

The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament said yesterday in a brief to a parliamentary committee that the NORAD agreement should be renewed for only another four years, rather than the usual five, so Ottawa can assess the impact of the SDI research program on arms control issues.

The centre, an independent think tank, also said Ottawa should consider issuing a statement at the time of the NORAD renewal, saying that Canada has neither plans nor desire to become involved in an active strategic defence strategy.

Previous NORAD agreements have included statements that Canadian participation in the alliance did not mean Canada would participate in active strategic defence against ballistic missiles. The clause was dropped in the last renewal in 1981, and the NDP would like it restored.

Mr. Weinberger and the Canadiana ministers did not discuss reinsertion of the clause, sources say.

In another brief to the parliamentary committee, Geoffrey Pearson, the head of the Government-sponsored Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, said Canada's involvement in NORAD means this country will be affected by any change in U.S. military doctrine.

/13104

CSO: 5220/19

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADIAN AEROSPACE ASSOCIATION ON STAR WARS RESEARCH

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 9 Oct 85 p C8

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — Canada could lose out on some of the consumer-oriented advances in technology by not participating in Star Wars research, the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada warns.

Spin-offs from Star Wars — a \$26 billion military research project — could result in development of new laser techniques for surgery, more complex computers and advances in fibre optics, among other things, the

association told the external affairs committee of the House of Commons yesterday.

The association, which represents about 160 aerospace companies, said it doubts that private companies will be awarded any significant contracts to research what's formally known as the strategic defence initiative.

The government has said Canada will not enter into a formal agreement with the United

States to develop a space shield to detect and destroy incoming weapons. But it has said private companies and universities are free to bid for contracts as well as government funds to conduct the research.

But association president Clive Kingston said that, by refusing to enter into a government-to-government agreement, Ottawa has effectively shut off significant involvement by private companies.

/13104
CSO: 52220/19

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADIAN PEACE MEETING DENOUNCES STAND ON STAR WARS ,

Ottawa THE WEEKEND CITIZEN in English 21 Sep 85 p A15

[Article by Ann McIlroy: "PM's Stand On Star Wars Lashed At Peace Meeting"]

[Text] Speakers at the opening of the Ontario Peace Movement's annual conference Friday attacked the Canadian government's stand on the controversial Star Wars anti-missile system.

Mel Watkins, an economics professor at the University of Toronto, and Ernie Regehr, of the University of Waterloo's Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, lambasted the Mulroney government in front of more than 100 people in the University of Ottawa's Fauteux Hall.

"Mulroney didn't go far enough, and hid lots of 'yes' answers behind a huge rhetorical 'no'," said Regehr.

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney rejected President Ronald Reagan's invitation to participate in Star Wars research, but strongly endorsed U.S. efforts to develop a defensive space-based weapon systems.

The prime minister also left Canadian companies free to bid on any of the contracts offered in the \$26-billion scheme, known formally as the strategic defence initiative.

"He should have come right out and condemned the whole project," said Watkins.

Regehr spoke against other facets of Mulroney's decision, saying the government had also left agencies like the National Re-

search Council free to participate in Star Wars research.

"It is quite possible taxpayers' money will still be used to fund the SDI in one form or another."

Regehr said the government should not have made funding already available for military research available to private companies participating in Star Wars.

"By allowing that kind of funding he is abusing Canadians who are paying taxes."

Mulroney's decision not to participate in Star Wars was, however, a victory for the peace movement, said Regehr.

"The public debate and government declaration demonstrated there is a critical peace movement in this country that cannot be ignored."

Members of the movement are no longer seen as emotional people out to bat bombs out of the sky, he said.

More than 200 people from peace groups across the province are expected to attend the weekend conference.

Kerstin Petersson, a conference organizer, said smaller groups from rural areas of the province need contact with more organized groups.

"We are trying to form a real network and get everyone working together."

They will discuss Star Wars, as nuclear-free zones and other topics.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

IZVESTIYA PUBLISHES REAGAN INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET JOURNALISTS

'Text' of Interview

PM041538 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

["Interview With U.S. President" -- IZVESTIYA headline; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] The U.S. President has granted an interview in the White House to a group of Soviet journalists comprising G.A. Shishkin, V.V. Ovchinnikov, S.N. Kondrashov, and G.A. Borovik. The President handed over the text of written answers to questions posed in advance; he also had a conversation with the journalists.

The text of the interview with R. Reagan follows below.

Question: For understandable reasons, the meeting shortly between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and yourself, Mr President, is anticipated as a event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make efforts to improve relations between the two countries and to ameliorate [ozdorovleniye] the international atmosphere as a whole. In the past period the Soviet Union has put forward a whole complex of specific proposals and has also taken a number of unilateral steps in the most diverse areas directly aimed at achieving the aforementioned objective. What is the United States going to do for its part?

Answer: I agree entirely that my meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is of special importance; I am looking forward to it with great interest. I sincerely hope we will be able to channel relations between our two countries into a more reliable and safer course. For my part, I will of course do everything in my power to achieve this objective.

Naturally, we study every Soviet proposal carefully, and when we find such proposals encouraging we note this with joy. But, if we find they are one-sided, we explain why we think so. At the same time, we have also put forward specific proposals; we have made dozens of such proposals concerning all aspects of our relations beginning with the elimination of chemical weapons and the settlement of regional conflicts and ending with the expansion of contacts and exchanges.

I will cite a few examples. One of the issues that has created a tremendous strain in U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years is the attempt to solve problems in various parts of the world by means of the use of military force. The use of weapons -- whether in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Africa -- has produced nothing either for the prospects of achieving peace or for the resolution of the problems of the regions in question, but

has merely brought unnecessary suffering to the peoples of these regions. In addition, it is also dangerous. We must find a method of ending attempts to solve problems by means of the use of force. It is for this reason that I have proposed that both our countries encourage the parties to such conflicts to cease the armed struggle and seek a negotiated solution. And, if they show a readiness for this, our countries must be able to reach agreement on how to promote a solution of the problem by peaceful means and also on refraining from granting military support to the warring sides. If it is possible to achieve peace, the United States will make a generous contribution to international efforts to restore the war-ravaged national economies, just as we did after World War II, when we helped friends and former foes equally; just as we have done in innumerable other cases.

The governments of our two countries agree that our nuclear arsenals are too great. Both governments are in favor of radical weapons reductions.

Therefore, the United States has made specific proposals to this end: reducing the number of ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 on each side and also totally eliminating the entire category of medium-range missiles from our arsenals. These were not "all or nothing" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate because we know that negotiations are necessary in order to reach a solution whereby neither side will feel threatened. We are prepared to renounce our superiority in certain areas if you, for your part, are prepared to do likewise. It is important to embark on reducing these terrible weapons in such a way that both sides feel secure and to continue this process until we have destroyed these weapons completely.

The events of the last 10 or 15 years have considerably increased mistrust between our countries. In order to resolve the key questions of our relations, something must be done to restore mutual trust. This requires the expansion of communication and contacts, and also close attention to ensuring both sides fulfill the agreements that have been reached. It is for this reason we have submitted literally between 40 and 50 proposals aimed at improving our working relationship, expanding links, and strengthening trust. For instance, we have proposed concluding an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful utilization of space. The joint Apollo-Soyuz spaceflight was carried out with tremendous success in 1975; we must try to resume cooperation of this sort. We have also submitted a number of proposals on establishing more direct contacts [boleye pryamykh kontaktov] between our military. If they got together a little more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unjustified. But, the main thing is that ordinary people from the two countries ought to get together more, especially our young people. After all, the future belongs to them! I would like thousands of students to travel each year from the United States to the USSR and vice versa in order to learn from one another and, most importantly, to learn to understand that, notwithstanding the difference between our world outlooks, we can and must live in peace.

Of course, we will not resolve all our disagreements at a single meeting. But, we want to take specific steps forward. The main thing is that I hope our meeting will provide the impetus for beginning a real process of problem-solving and that we will be able to reach agreement on what kind of course will bring us to a safer world for everyone and to growing cooperation between our countries.

Question: The Soviet Union advocates peaceful coexistence with states belonging to the other social system, the United States included. A number of your speeches have pursued the idea that military conflict must be prevented, despite the differences between

our countries. In other words, we must learn to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize that questions of arms limitation and reduction are and will be crucial in their relations. The special responsibility borne by the USSR and the United States for the fate of peace is an objective fact. What do you believe can be achieved in the security sphere at your meeting with M.S. Gorbachev?

Answer: First of all, I would say that all countries must live in peace regardless of whether they have the same different social systems. Even if the social systems are similar, this does not give a country the right to use force against another. But, you are quite right to say we must learn to live in peace. I have said many times that nuclear war cannot be won and it must be prevented. This means there must be no war between our countries. You are also right to say our countries bear a special responsibility to peace -- not only because we have huge nuclear arsenals, but also because we are great powers and, whether we like it or not, our example and actions also influence everyone around us.

Questions of our relations include not only the reaching of new agreements, but also the observance of old ones. Your country often accuses us of interfering in your internal affairs on issues such as human rights, but that is precisely a good example. Ten years ago our countries became parties to the Helsinki agreements and assumed commitments to act according to certain norms. We observe these commitments and we expect this of others too.

Soviet-U.S. relations exert an influence on regional conflicts, on political relations between our friends and allies, and on a great deal else.

The fact that our countries possess the biggest nuclear arsenals with the greatest destructive might obliges us to ensure they are never used and that we lead the world toward the elimination of these terrible weapons.

I think our meeting with General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev may be the start of progress toward the goals our countries have set themselves: sharply reducing nuclear arms and taking measures aimed at completely eliminating them. We can do this by finding specific ways of surmounting obstacles in the process of the [summit] talks, thereby giving a substantial fillip to our representatives at the [arms] talks. Of course, we will also have to resolve other questions, because it will be very difficult to secure substantial shifts on the question of arms limitation unless we simultaneously take measures to lessen tension, to reduce the use of force and the threat of its use, and also to strengthen faith in our ability to maintain constructive relations.

Question: As is well known, in Geneva in January the USSR and the United States agreed that a primary aim [perveyshaya tsel] of their new talks should be the prevention of an arms race in space. Yet, now the U.S. delegation at the talks is trying to reduce matters to a discussion merely of the question of nuclear arms and is refusing to speak of preventing an arms race in space. How is this U.S. position to be understood?

Answer: Your account of the essence of the January accord is incorrect. In fact, our countries' foreign ministers agreed that the "aim of the talks will be the formulation of effective accords aimed at preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." They went on to agree that the "subject of the talks will be the complex of issues concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range -- and all these issues will be examined and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question shows a misunderstanding of the U.S. stance, allow me to clarify it for you.

In the first place, we believe that nuclear weapons of mass destruction are the most threatening weapons for mankind today. They are offensive weapons and they exist today, in very large numbers. Thus, our paramount task is to start radically reducing them, creating conditions for their ultimate elimination in the future. Since a large proportion of missiles must pass through space to reach their targets, the reduction of this type of weapon is no less important for the prevention of an arms race in space than for the termination of the arms race on earth.

As I have already noted, we have submitted specific, definite proposals for this purpose. Your government recently put forward counterproposals, we will respond to them in the spirit of a true desire to meet the Soviet side halfway in order to enable us to move forward in the quest for practical solutions acceptable to both countries.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive means are closely interconnected and that these questions must be examined, as our foreign ministers agreed, in their inter-relationship. Our proposals accord fully with this view. At present, we are trying to begin a detailed discussion with the Soviet representatives in Geneva about how to achieve equilibrium between offensive and defensive means. If scientists succeed in developing [razrabotat] effective means of defense in the future, then both our countries could use them to defend themselves and their allies without threatening one another. If we finally manage to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons, the countries will need to have a defense against such weapons in case they fall into the hands of some madman who would decide to use them for blackmail.

Specifically, we have submitted the following proposals: on strategic nuclear weapons -- reduction of each side's nuclear arsenals to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. This will mean an enormous reduction in the level of arms, which will help to considerably strengthen strategic stability. We have also proposed that agreement be reached on strict limitations of other types of weapons. Since the structure of our armed forces is different and since the Soviet side has objected that it would have to restructure its forces, we have proposed seeking mutual solutions which will make it possible to balance forces in light of these differences in individual fields of U.S. and Soviet military might.

On medium-range nuclear forces, we believe the best thing is to altogether eliminate the entire category of arms, which includes the SS-20 type missiles (441 missiles) deployed by the Soviet Union and our Pershing-2 missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this proves unacceptable at this time, we have also proposed a draft interim agreement envisaging an equal number of warheads for U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category; at the lowest possible quantitative level.

On the questions of space and defense, we propose to discuss possibilities with Soviet representatives which may help the creation [sozdaniye] of new technology for a gradual transition by each side toward increasing reliance on defensive systems, rather than basing its security on offensive nuclear weapons.

Frankly speaking, I find it difficult to understand why some people misunderstand or misinterpret our position. Research concerning strategic defense in the United States is conducted in precisely the same areas as similar research in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: First, the Soviet Union has been working in many of

these areas longer than we have and it is ahead of us in some of them. Second, we speak openly about our program because our political system demands open debate before decisions on such issues are made. But, these differences of approach to political decisionmaking must not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are engaged in similar research work; there is nothing wrong in this.

But in this line, we find it somewhat difficult to understand why we are accused of all kinds of aggressive intentions when we are doing only what you are doing. Here, it is important for us to be able to discuss these questions frankly with you.

Generally speaking, we are striving to attain a balanced, fair, and verifiable agreement or series of agreements which will enable us to do what we agreed in Geneva in January; namely, to end the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no dirty tricks, just as we have not the slightest desire to threaten the Soviet Union. Frankly speaking, if the Soviet Union were to take a similar stance, we could start advancing very rapidly toward an agreement.

Question: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a whole series of major steps: It has adopted a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, declared a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, ceased the deployment of medium-range missiles in its European territory, and even reduced their numbers. Why has the United States done nothing similar?

Answer: Actually, we have repeatedly taken measures to reduce tension and shown our good will.

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we showed our peaceful intentions by demobilizing our armed forces unusually quickly.

The United States and the NATO countries have repeatedly stressed in their statements that we will never use our weapons -- either conventional or nuclear -- unless we are attacked.

Allow me to add a fact which, perhaps, is little known in the Soviet Union. By agreement with the NATO countries, the United States has already removed more than 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe since 1979. When this operation is fully completed, more than 2,400 nuclear warheads will have been removed in all. That means we are eliminating more than five nuclear shells [snaryady] for each medium-range missile we intend to install. As a result, the numerical strength of our nuclear forces in Europe will be the lowest for roughly 20 years.

Currently, the Soviet Union has deployed 441 SS-20 missiles with 3 warheads each, making 1,323 warheads all told. I don't need to remind you that the Soviet side started deployment when NATO had no similar means in Europe. At first we tried to eliminate these means through negotiations, but when we failed to reach agreement NATO embarked on a limited retaliatory deployment, which is gradually being carried out. Today the Soviet Union has a seven-to-one advantage in warheads on already deployed missiles. Our position remains the same as it has always been: It would be best to agree on the complete elimination of these types of missiles. But even if we are disappointed in our hopes of reaching agreement and NATO is forced to embark on full deployment, that will only amount to no more than 572 missiles, each with 1 warhead.

Moreover, President Carter abandoned production both of enhanced radiation warheads and of B-1 bombers. The Soviet Union took no measures in response. In 1977 and 1978,

the United States also tried to start talks on banning the development [razrabotka] of antisatellite weapons. The Soviet Union rejected such a ban and engaged in developing [razrabotka] and testing an antisatellite system. Now that the Soviet Union has already created an operational antisatellite system, it is now proposing that a "freeze" be introduced before the United States has time to test its own system.

The questions concerning our two countries are so important that the peoples of both of them must be accurately informed of our governments' positions. Moreover, each country's mass media have an important role to play. We must not try to "score points" off the otherside, and the media, for their part, must not distort our respective positions.

It is important for each side to approach the other side's proposals seriously and to make sincere efforts to overcome the things that divide us so as to serve the interests of our two countries and the entire world. It is in this spirit that I am preparing for the meeting with CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Gorbachev.

R. Reagan went on to answer the journalists' spoken questions.

Question: Mr President, we have familiarized ourselves with your written replies. You set out old U.S. proposals in them. They have already been examined by the Soviet side and assessed as unbalanced and as giving advantages to the United States. You have not said what the U.S. reply is to the new Soviet proposals. Yet, it is precisely this question that primarily interests people before Geneva.

Answer: In Geneva our delegation at the talks will give our reply, which will reflect the thrust of our original proposal. It will show that we accept certain of the numerical indicators contained in the general secretary's proposals.

Question: According to the figures of the latest opinion poll carried out by THE WASHINGTON POST and ABC TV, Americans stated by 74 percent to 20 percent that they would prefer a reduction in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, not the creation of space arms by the United States. That, judging by the poll, is the choice the U.S. people are making. In these circumstances, what will be your response, Mr President, to the choice made by the U.S. public?

Answer: There is a misunderstanding here, the term "star wars" was coined by a U.S. politician and has spread everywhere. We do not speak of "star wars" at all. We speak of a quest for defensive weapons which do not kill people, but prevent nuclear missiles from reaching their target after they are launched from their silos -- making it possible to intercept these weapons systems. When inaccurate terms are used people get the wrong idea. A public opinion poll was held recently and our people were asked about their attitude to "star wars," and only 30 percent approved of it -- approximately the same as in the case you have mentioned. But, when the question was formulated differently -- how do they view our research to create a "strategic defensive shield" -- over 90 percent of those polled advocated continuing the program.

Question: In the present situation in the international arena attempts to create the "space shield" which you have mentioned will inevitably lead to the suspicion that the country creating the "shield" in fact wants to acquire the capability for a first nuclear strike. Many people agree with that truth. And Americans have expressed their opinion by pointing out that if things come down to a choice between the creation of such a space system and nuclear arms reductions, they prefer nuclear arms reductions. That assessment by the U.S. public seems realistic. I would like to ask how the U.S. Government will react to this opinion of the U.S. people's?

Answer: Yes, of course, if anyone created such a defensive system in combination with nuclear offensive arms then, yes, he would be more tempted to venture to inflict a first strike. But your country started work on this kind of plan years before us and so, I think it is we who ought to have certain suspicions that you yourselves want to achieve this.

But I have said it before and I am ready to say it again at the summit, if these weapons become possible and if our research shows this, we will say to the entire world: "There they are, be our guest!" We will not deploy these defensive weapons until we have gotten rid of our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. And we will make them available to other countries, including the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet Union and the United States state that they will destroy their offensive arms, we will deploy these defensive weapons in case some madman somewhere in the world tries to create nuclear offensive arms again. And we will all be at peace if we know that when some madman somewhere tries to do this, we will all be able to defend ourselves against him. So I assure you now that we will not try to monopolize defensive weapons with a view to gaining a first-strike capability.

Question: Mr President, in 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Defense Systems at summit level, which says absolutely clearly: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based," But some representatives of your administration now claim this treaty authorizes the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space-based ABM weapons. This arbitrary interpretation can scarcely promote agreement. What is the U.S. Administration's real position with regard to the ABM Treaty? Does it intend to observe it or not?

Answer: There are two different interpretations of the treaty. The treaty has an additional article which seems more liberal than Article V. On the other hand, we have clearly shown we intend to keep within the limits of the strict definition of the treaty. As for research -- and that would also include tests -- that accords with the treaty.

As I have already said, what we are doing now complies with the treaty and is what the Soviet Union has been doing for some time, carrying out the same kind of research. But when matters reach the point of deployment, I don't know what the Soviet Union intends to do and when and if its research leads to the creation [sozdaniye] of such weapons. But I do know what we intend to do and I have already talked about it.

You may object now that if we intend to eliminate nuclear armaments, why do we need defense? Well, I will repeat what I said earlier. We all know how to produce nuclear weapons and there is a possibility that a madman might appear in the world sometime; after all, our two countries were allies in a war which did in fact break out because of such a madman. That is why it would be something like what happened in Geneva after World War I, when the states decided to ban poison gases, but we all kept gas masks. So these weapons, if they could be created, would be today's gas mask. But, we want everyone to have them and the elimination of offensive weapons would be a condition of their acquisition and a condition of our own deployment of these weapons.

So we will never violate this treaty.

Question: Unfortunately, Mr President, we have no opportunity to debate these questions with you, although we have different viewpoints.

Answer: Well, never mind.

Question: I should like to ask you to explain an interesting phenomenon. In 1979 after 7 years of the most painstaking work, the SALT II treaty was concluded between the USSR and the United States. It enshrined military-strategic parity between our countries. This was confirmed by President Carter, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the most eminent U.S. military specialists. But, when you became President you suddenly announced that the USSR had long since overtaken the United States in the military field. You have been repeating this for 5 years now. As recently as 17 September you said it again. But this year the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed that military-strategic parity exists between our countries. How is this strange contradiction to be explained?

Answer: In reality there is no contradiction. Some people speak of parity in the sense that we have an adequate deterrent potential, in other words we have sufficient opportunities for making trouble for anyone who attacks us. But no, your arsenal is greatly superior to ours.

I realize I have not answered many of your questions. I guess I have been slow and thus deprived you of the opportunity to ask other questions. I know you still have many questions and I regret we have no time for them. But I would like to say that the Soviet Union and the United States, or to be more precise Russia and the United States have been allies in one of these wars -- the last and biggest, World War II. Americans and Russians died next to each other, fighting a common enemy. Wars are also buried on Soviet soil. I want to say to the General Secretary: Wars are initiated by governments, not by peoples. I have a sheet of paper on which I recently wrote down some words from an article and there is a very great deal of truth in them: "Peoples do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they do not trust each other." I hope that during our summit meeting we will be able to find ways of proving by deeds and not just by words that we have no need not to trust each other. And that we will be able to stop burdening our peoples by increasing armaments instead of creating increasing prosperity for them.

Journalists' Report

PM041930 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Report from Washington by G. Shishkin, V. Ovchinnikov, S. Kondrashov, and G. Borovik entitled: "Apropos of R. Reagan's Interview"]

[Excerpts] We four Soviet journalists arrived in Washington by air to interview U.S. President Ronald Reagan. The interview was arranged on the proposal of the U.S. side.

... 1400 sharp the door of the President's Oval Office opened. We saw the U.S. President standing there brightly lit by television floodlights. He courteously welcomed the Soviet journalists. Apart from television reporters and photographers, who were let in for a few minutes, there were some fifteen presidential aids in the office, including his chief aid, -- Donald Regan, White House chief of staff; Larry Speakes, deputy press secretary; and Patrick Buchanan, adviser on propaganda, known for his ultraconservative views. They did not meddle in the course of the interview, yet they were not just curious onlookers.

President Reagan is reported to have prepared for this interview, and, correspondingly, for the opportunity to appear in the Soviet press, no less carefully than he did for the television debate with Walter Mondale, his rival in last year's presidential elections.

It does not matter too much whether it was so or not. Another thing is important. People here in Washington and in the United States are looking forward with growing interest and hope to the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva. The less time there is to go before Geneva, the stronger the expectation of positive practical results at the talks between the leaders of the two great powers.

The more so because the latest meeting of this kind took place more than six years ago and since then Soviet-U.S. relations have sharply deteriorated; in the first place because of the tough, confrontational policy of the Reagan administration, which has from the very first days purposefully sought to dismantle the peaceful edifice of detente and started implementing the gigantic buildup of the U.S. Armed Forces, having spent a trillion dollars on it in the course of four years.

Like all people, Americans are asking: What are the participants in the summit meeting going there with? The answer from the Soviet side is clear, an answer inspiring justified hope. As a matter of practically contributing to a favorable outcome of the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union has taken unilateral steps and put forward a package of constructive measures whose implementation could lead to a breakthrough in the development of international relations. These proposals, set forth by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in his speech to French parliamentarians, are well known. Their thrust is to bar the way to a further arms race, prevent it in outer space, while very radically reducing nuclear arms stockpiles.

The Soviet initiatives have made a powerful impact on the international political climate. The general opinion, which is also popular in the Western press, is that Moscow has taken over the initiative in the political-psychological preparations conducted by both sides in the period before the Geneva meeting. The Soviet arguments and the Soviet practical actions have exerted such influence that Western politicians can no longer ignore them. Even here, in the United States where the mass media's deep-rooted anti-Sovietism cannot but influence the common American, public opinion polls show the attitude to Soviet policy and to the Soviet leadership's actions is changing, and changing in a fairly substantial manner.

This fact has caused open concern, if not alarm, in the U.S. Administration.

The matter at stake is its domestic and international reputation, Washington's image in the eyes of its own and other peoples. The matter at stake is trust in and support of the policy of the White House on the part of its European and other allies. The tactics of naysaying and hushing up Soviet proposals can hardly persuade anybody any longer, while the tough propaganda rhetoric of administration spokesmen has plainly come to bore people. The whole community is waiting for practical actions rather than words.

That is the dilemma U.S. foreign policy has found itself in. It is against this backdrop, in these conditions that rush efforts are being made in Washington to improve the "image" of U.S. policy -- and of the U.S. president -- before the meeting in Geneva. This also constitutes, as a matter of fact, the entire rationale behind Ronald Reagan's interview to members of the Soviet press.

So the U.S. President has expressed a desire to speak to the Soviet people through the Soviet press. IZVESTIYA has granted him this opportunity. Having answered the five questions we had forwarded to him in advance, the President, alas, allotted us only 30 minutes for a conversation and we were not able to ask him even a third of our questions concerning U.S. policy. As far as the content of the President's replies is concerned, they hold in effect nothing new for those who have even the slightest knowledge of the political world outlook and, of course, practical political actions of Ronald Reagan. His answers distinctly show a vision of the world through the eyes of a U.S. conservative who is prepared to forget or not to notice obvious facts that are known to all, if they fail to correspond to his views -- or expose the nature of his activities. Stereotypes are corrosive [vevshiyesya, kak rzha] and prevent our seeing the world the way it is.

Let us note at first, however, the assurances of the U.S. leadership's good intentions which will be duly appreciated in our country if they are matched by practical actions within the next few weeks. The general words about the forthcoming meeting in Geneva sound sensible. The reader can return to them himself.

In the interview, the U.S. President readily repeated the words which he stinted so niggardly during his first months and years in the White House: "...We must learn to live in peace.... A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought: And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war." The Soviet people, just like the Americans and like all other nations, are of course prepared to welcome the hope, voiced by the President: that his meeting with the Soviet leader "can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination."

But, however good general words sound, their true worth can only be known from specific actions and facts, from real manifestations and directions of policy. So let us first speak of arbitrary use of facts. The President says his administration has made dozens of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union which "cover every aspect of our relationship," but he sidesteps the fact that with his coming to the White House the U.S. Administration suspended Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe and talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms for more than a year. It unilaterally terminated the operation of a number of agreements.

The President makes propaganda in his interview for U.S. proposals declined by the Soviet Union since they are one-sided in character and give unilateral advantages to the nuclear forces of his country, while providing for undercutting the most important component of the strategic forces of the USSR. He recalls with praise his "zero option" concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, but does not specify that if it is carried out, the Soviet Union would indeed be left with a zero, while the Americans would be left with their nuclear-capable medium-range aircraft, including carrier-borne aircraft, and, besides, the nuclear weapons of Britain and France, which are also trained on Soviet territory.

President Reagan speaks about the U.S. proposal to reduce the number of warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBM's and SLBM's) down to 5,000 on each side. On the face of it, it may seem this is an equal number. But, there is no equality here. In fact, this proposal is a way toward a U.S. military advantage. The U.S. approach leaves the course open toward a buildup of combat charges [boyezaryady] on long-range cruise missiles. The U.S. side is trying to place cruise missiles outside the framework of negotiations and reductions. It is evading the Soviet proposal for a ban on such missiles, declaring in general form that the United States is prepared to limit somewhat only air-based cruise missiles. On the whole, the U.S. stand provides not for a reduction, but for a buildup of nuclear charges [zaryady], almost up to 18,000.

Reagan states 2,400 nuclear combat charges will be withdrawn from Europe. Yet, in actual fact, there will be no reduction of the U.S. nuclear weapons stocks in Europe. Instead of the obsolete nuclear warheads (for the "Sergeant" and "Honest John" missiles, which have been phased out) and old airbombs, the Americans have already delivered to Europe 960 nuclear warheads for "Lance" missiles and 200 new airbombs with a switchable TNT equivalent. The United States is to bring to Europe 900 warheads for the "Pershing" missiles; 500 combat charges for land-based long-range cruise missiles; 300 neutron warheads for the "Lance" missiles; 2,200 neutron artillery shells for 203.2 mm and 155 mm howitzers; and up to 3,000 MK61 airbombs, which is a total of nearly 7,000 new nuclear munitions.

Thus, Europe, far from being freed from, is, on the contrary, being increasingly crammed with U.S. nuclear weapons.

In an attempt to prove "Soviet nuclear superiority," the U.S. President takes an overstated number (441 units, 1,323 warheads) of Soviet SS-20 missiles, which are deployed, for that matter, not only in the European zone, but also in the Asian part of the USSR, and compares it only with the number of U.S. missiles deployed in Europe (209 units). In this equation they disregard the nuclear missiles of Britain and France (178 missiles with 530 warheads on them), which are a component part of NATO's nuclear potential.

The real balance of medium-range missiles in Europe is as follows:

The NATO member-countries have a total of 387 missiles with 739 warheads on them. If we take into account the new Soviet SS-20 missiles in the European zone, their number now is 243, the total number of warheads on them being 729. Thus, there is a rough balance as regards the medium-range missiles.

Taking into account the air force in Europe, NATO has even more medium-range delivery vehicles (1,015 to 850) and nuclear charges on them (roughly 3,000 to 2,000) than the Warsaw Pact.

The balance of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States, was checked many times in the course of seven years in the process of drawing up the SALT-II treaty and officially placed on record in 1979 in signing that treaty. At present, the number of strategic delivery vehicles of the sides has not changed as compared with 1979. The USSR has a somewhat larger number of them than the United States (2,504 to 2,215), but the United States has, as before, a far larger number of combat charges on them due to the equipping of hundreds of heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles. Yet, on the whole there is a rough balance.

Such a conclusion was also drawn by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in a report to Congress in 1984: "Nowadays there is a rough nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union." As R. O'Neill, director of the International Strategic Research Institute, just told a press conference in London on the occasion of the publication of the Institute's annual report, there is at present a "rough balance" in strategic arms between the USSR and the United States.

In this connection, along with pronouncements in favor of peace, Reagan's remarks strike by the figures game. This is not so innocent an undertaking since policy is based on it, and the continued numbers juggling is fraught with uneasy and even unpredictable times. Such a departure from reality cannot, naturally, but give rise to concern.

All these facts have long been known and explained in great detail more than once, and they in the White House greatly underestimate the political grounding of the Soviet people, if they believe that this way they will "discover America" -- and the U.S. position.

Reagan was deliberately trying to distort the fact when saying "the Soviet Union has at present 441 SS-20 missiles deployed with three warheads on each of them, which makes a total of 1,323 warheads." Such claims are aimed at deliberately distorting the state of things.

In this connection, the USSR Defense Ministry has officially said: "The number of SS-20 missiles in the European zone is 243, and on the whole of the USSR's territory the number of SS-20 missiles is considerably smaller than the number of 441 given by NATO." So Reagan's formula about a "seven-fold" Soviet "superiority" is a false, falsified equation.

We would like to especially touch upon the U.S. plans to militarize outer space and how they are presented in R. Reagan's interview. These plans, which have been actively and perseveringly implemented after the U.S. President put forward his "Strategic Defense Initiative" in March 1983, have become the main stumbling block in the way towards improving Soviet-U.S. relations and the whole international atmosphere. This stumbling block can be neither passed over nor disregarded. There is only one way to remove it -- by preventing an arms race in outer space.

Without the resolution of this key issue, the President's words about starting to move on the road toward "the radical reduction of nuclear weapons" will only be good, but deceptive wishing. And the reality will be an uncontrolled process of an even more intensive arms race, its extension into the next century -- into the next millennium -- further enormous military spending, which is a burden on our peoples, and a serious growth of the nuclear threat.

Americans realize the danger carried by the "Strategic Defense Initiative," despite the incessant drum-beating for this pet idea of the President. A recent public opinion poll taken by the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST and the ABC television network has shown that the Americans prefer by a majority of 74 percent against 20 percent a reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR to the U.S. development of space weapons.

This realistic choice of the U.S. people is consonant with the Soviet stand as spelled out by Mikhail Gorbachev in his replies to the U.S. magazine TIME: "We call on the United States seriously to reach agreement with us on strategic nuclear arms, on medium-range arms, and on problems of outer space."

But what most of the common Americans understand, the U.S. President is unwilling to understand, refuses to understand. Yet, claims are being made that decision-making in the United States is done in a democratic spirit, by asking the prior consent of the people. But the White House did not ask the opinion of the Americans when drawing the country into the bloody adventure in Southeast Asia for many years or when preparing to use the raw force of Marines against tiny Grenada. When we asked the President a question backed up by the findings of the above-mentioned public opinion survey conducted by THE WASHINGTON POST and ABC, he evaded an answer.

Instead, he began lauding the "defensive character" of the planned space weapons, albeit he was forced to admit actually that the "space shield", which is being created along with nuclear offensive weapons by one of the sides, increases the suspicion of another side as regards the possibility of launching the first nuclear strike under cover of such a shield.

At the end of the interview, the President took out of his pocket a card specially prepared by him and read a favorite quotation: "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." At the same time, if one takes his word on trust, he believes that in this complex, contradictory, conflicting, and distrustful world, the other side will believe his promises of sharing one of the top U.S. technological secrets involved in the creation of the "space shield", under whose cover the United States will sharpen its nuclear sword. This is highly unconvincing "idealism" when expressed by an advocate of the positions of strength policy, who, in addition, is known for his anti-Soviet convictions, which he does not even conceal, but publicizes and gets pleasure out of.

One cannot but doubt the President's promises to make the "strategic defense" technology "available to other countries, including the Soviet Union," while even the allies of the United States -- which Washington proposed join in the implementation of its program -- complain that the United States does not intend to give them access to its technological secrets and that the U.S. Administration has a different aim of starting, to use the current expression, "a brain drain", thus saving U.S. resources and accelerating implementation of the SDI program as much as possible.

How can one rely on the assurances given by the White House, while only a few weeks ago the Pentagon and the CIA issued with much pomp a report accusing, without any sound reason, the Soviet Union of attempts at "stealing U.S. technology" and demanding even a further toughening of measures to prevent a "leakage of secrets to the East".

In answer to the question whether the U.S. Administration was going to observe Article 5 of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Defense Systems saying that each side will not develop, test, or deploy antiballistic missile components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based, Reagan was forced to admit that there are varying "interpretations" of the treaty among his administration. He said the United States intended to abide strictly by the terms of the treaty.

Nevertheless, the President insisted in his reply that "what we are doing with regard to research -- and that would include testing -- is within the treaty."

But here is a remark by Gerard Smith, who led the U.S. delegation to the talks on the limitation of strategic armaments that were marked, specifically, by the signing of the ABM Treaty and who is justly considered a major authority on the subject: "The current debates in the administration on the 'interpretation' of the ABM Treaty cannot be described as anything but absurd. There can be no doubt that the treaty bans the testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems. The language of the treaty, especially its Clause Five, is utterly clear."

In our view, the conversation with the President confirmed yet another time that the ABM Treaty is becoming an obstacle in the way of the Washington administration's implementation of the "star wars" plans. In a bid to pave the way for the militarization of outer space, the United States is prepared, as Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, director of the SDI organization, bluntly declared casting aside verbal subtleties, to depart at some moment from the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty is not the only one to be affected in case of the realization of SDI.

Reflecting the concern of broad sections of the U.S. public, well-known physicist Carl Sagan wrote in the DISCOVER magazine: "The 'star wars' program, in the form it has been conceived, will violate -- one way or another -- all the arms control treaties concluded with great difficulty between the Soviet Union and the United States.

"These are the treaties banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater; the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; the ABM Treaty; and the SALT I and SALT II treaties."

One should mention that the President made several attempts to justify his commitment to the idea of militarizing outer space by claims that the USSR has since long conducted similar work.

This allegation does not correspond to reality.

The United States initiated the development of an antisatellite system (ASAT) long before satellites appeared in orbit. Way back in 1964, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson said: "The British dominated the seas and ruled the world. The United States dominated the air and led the free world ever since it established this domination. The situation will now be controlled by those who will dominate outer space."

And these were not merely words.

As early as the dawn of the space era, the United States embarked on the road of exploring space as a potential sphere of armed struggle, developed a concept of anti-satellite weapons. It became the first country to have tested an ASAT way back in October 1959, intercepting an artificial earth satellite, Explorer-6, with a missile launched from a B-47. The development of an interceptor spacecraft, Saint, was started in the early sixties. Two ground-based ASAT's were established: on Kwajalein Island on the basis of Nike-Zeus anti-missiles in 1963 and on Johnston Island with the use of the Thor missile in 1964. Simultaneously, the United States carried out work in the field of developing space strike systems (for warfare from outer space against earth).

The Soviet Union was compelled to respond to all these U.S. "initiatives" and adopt countermeasures to ensure its security. The USSR started developing its own anti-satellite system considerably later (in the late sixties). As is well-known, several years ago the Soviet Union proposed not only banning, but destroying antisatellite systems.

By now, the doctrine of domination in outer space, the militant philosophy that "the one to be first in outer space will be first on earth" have become integral parts of U.S. state policy. The U.S. military openly talk about that. Edward Aldridge, under secretary of the Air Force, declared: "One does not require particular imagination to understand the country controlling outer space might control the world."

The United States is now accelerating the development of a second-generation anti-satellite system (ASAT). Several tests have already been conducted, including against a real target in space. The system is to be adopted for service in the near future. Besides, space shuttles possess antisatellite capabilities (removing earth satellites from orbit, rendering them useless).

It was not our task to study the psychology of the White House chief. It was more important for us to ascertain his position on major issues of our time. However, after talking with his closest aides and with the President himself, we were able to observe the laboratory of White House political thinking to some extent from the inside.

The old truth that judgement should be made on the basis of deeds, rather than words, is well-known and indisputable. It applies to the essence of policy. Another factor is also important: how words correlate to deeds. In other words, the point at issue is the formula of political ethics within the U.S. Administration.

The problem, not the least insignificant, is that people who provide the leadership, including at the highest level, should be basically conscientious with information. Taking about our personal impressions, the most disquieting of them is, probably, that we saw yet another time with what lightness they in the White House report to a direct distortion of truth; how much stereotypes, worked out by U.S. propaganda, dominate them; and how deeply they seem to be convinced that the rest of the world is either not informed about the real state of affairs on our planet, or forgetful, or obliged to think the way they think in the White House.

This impression, of course, is not new and it was not only formed on the basis of our conversation with the President. But precisely on these days: when especially many interviews are given in the White House, when the U.S. President recently made a lengthy speech at the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly. This impression, one might say, has become particularly strong, acquiring very clear and alarming outlines.

One more thing. On the days when a special sense of responsibility is required from the leadership of such a great country as the United States, the conviction has strengthened that it lacks this responsibility.

We would like, nevertheless, to end our article on an optimistic note. Life flows, people everywhere strive for peace, and this could be easily spotted in Washington as well during the few days we spent here in anticipation of the interview with President Reagan.

The interview turned out to be contradictory. The good words about peace, about the striving for accord with the Soviet Union went side by side with unfounded accusations about our country's foreign policy. It seems it takes an immense effort to find a way out of the pale of ideological prejudices. Still, the very fact of the recognition of the need for extensive Soviet-U.S. dialogue is a positive sign. This time of words is going away. The time of actions has arrived. One would like to believe that the USSR's readiness to achieve a drastic turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations will encounter in Geneva a constructive response from the U.S. side. The world is looking forward to this.

G. Shishkin,
V. Ovchinnikov,
S. Kondrashov,
G. Borovik
Washington, D.C. November

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CSO: 5200/1128

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR COMMENTS, CRITICISM OF REAGAN INTERVIEW

TASS Report

LD041409 Moscow TASS in English 1402 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 4 TASS -- The newspaper IZVESTIYA today carries Ronald Reagan's interview in which the U.S. President sets forth his position on problems of Soviet-U.S. relations and a number of international issues.

The President among other things touched upon the forthcoming summit meeting in Geneva. Alongside general pronouncements in favor of peace and normalized relations with the Soviet Union, attempts were made in the interview to distort the Soviet foreign policy. The policy with respect to so-called regional problems was presented in the same light. Evading answers to questions concerning Washington's course with regard to Nicaragua, southern Africa and the Middle East, the President tried to create the impression that tension in the world is a consequence of the Soviet policy in different regions.

At the same time IZVESTIYA carries an article by four Soviet journalists, Gennadiy Shishkin, Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, Stanislav Kondrashev and Genrikh Borovik, who interviewed the President. They write about their impressions from the talk with the President and express their views on the questions which he touched upon during the meeting, including on key aspects of the present international situation and the Soviet-U.S. relations.

The interview of the U.S. President, they write, turned out to be contradictory. The good words about peace, about the striving towards accord with the Soviet Union went side by side with the unfounded accusations with regard to our country's foreign policy. However, the very fact of the recognition of the need for extensive Soviet-American dialogue is a positive sign. One would like to believe that the U S S R's readiness to achieve a drastic turn for the better in Soviet-American relations will encounter in Geneva a constructive response from the American side.

TV Comment

OW051140 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 5 Nov 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report "from the United States" by special correspondent Genrikh Borovik]

[Excerpts] Hello comrades. A few days ago, at the initiative of the White House, the U.S. President received four Soviet journalists for an interview -- Gennadiy Shishkin, Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, Stanislav Kondrashov, and myself.

Earlier TASS sent him our questions from Moscow to which we received written replies in Washington. Besides this, we also asked him a number of verbal questions. Unfortunately, this part of our interview in the White House lasted only 30 minutes. Of course, we expected the U.S. President to tell the Soviet readers what the U.S. Administration plans to do in response to the constructive Soviet proposals, first of all, on prohibiting the militarization of space and reducing nuclear arsenals.

Unfortunately, the U.S. President, rather than talk about serious proposals on how to make the world better and more secure, chose to propagandize the old U.S. position. But this position has been elucidated in every detail in our press in the most comprehensive way and the White House obviously underestimates how well informed the Soviet people are if it thinks it can astound them in this way.

In the limited time of the "Vremya" program it is difficult to characterize even some of the answers we received from the President and which have been published in IZVESTIYA, but the four of us will express our opinions on this in the pages of the same paper. Right now, I would like to describe our impressions relating to the atmosphere in the White House.

Over a period of several hours we rubbed shoulders with the closest colleagues and advisers of the President and with him personally, to a certain extent we could view the laboratory of political thinking in the White House from the inside.

Perhaps the most distinct and alarming impression we got was that we were once again convinced of the ease with which those in the White House can distort even generally known truths, how firmly they adhere to propaganda stereotypes there, and how deeply entrenched is the conviction that the rest of the world is either uninformed, forgetful, or obliged to think as they do in Washington.

At a time when so much depends on the position of the United States, a great country, one would of course like to see a greater feeling of responsibility to the people in the U.S. leadership for its own actions and its words. If they treat universally known facts of the past and present so facetiously in the White House, then how difficult it is to believe what is being said there about the future.

Of course, many promises the U.S. Administration makes are not believed in the world. First of all, of course, people do not believe the defensive nature of the U.S. "star wars" plan, which the President also publicized in his replies to us. The Soviet proposals outlined by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to prohibit the militarization of space and reduce nuclear arsenals, and the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet Government to normalize the relations between our countries, have aroused a warm wave of hope throughout the world and in the United States as well.

Public opinion polls show that 75 percent of the U.S. people support reduction of nuclear arsenals instead of the creation of space weapons. In other words, they are practically in agreement with our proposals. The White House looks lost in the face of this wave. There are responsible people in Washington who have simply become afraid of the real possibility that an agreement between our countries may be achieved.

At the same time, it would be incorrect not to note the good things said by the President, about the fact that despite the differences in our systems we must live in peace, that in a nuclear war there can be no victor, and that it is necessary to conduct a broad dialogue between the USSR and the United States. We value these words because we presume they represent evidence of an evolution in views.

After all, we have had to listen to quite the opposite from Washington and if these words are true, then the world is justified in expecting a constructive response from the U.S. side to the Soviet readiness to achieve in Geneva an abrupt turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations.

U.S. Media Notes 'Blunders'

LD051813 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Text] Washington, November 5 TASS -- Commenting on Ronald Reagan's interview to Soviet journalists, the U.S. mass media note that during answers to questions the President made a number of blunders causing serious doubts about some aspects of the United States policy.

According to the A.B.C. television network, some of the President's pronouncements caused embarrassment in the United States. Another television network, the N.B.C. points out that during the interview the President made a dubious statement about the program of "star wars". It became clear that the President presented his policy in a wrong light, moreover, on the main question of the coming Geneva summit, the television company notes.

Thrice in the course of the interview he said that the United States will not deploy the anti-missile defence system with elements of space basing until it gets rid of its nuclear missiles, of its offensive missiles, the N.B.C. notes.

As more than once in the past, representatives of the White House had to hasten with "explanations" about Reagan's pronouncements. At a press conference deputy press secretary of the White House Larry Speakes had to deal with many questions as to what construction should be put on that statement by the President. Journalists asked him if this means that the administration altered its stand, that it is going to take steps toward reduction and complete elimination of offensive nuclear arsenals, and not to accompany work for the militarization of outer space with the build up of such arsenals.

It was also pointed out to Speakes that prior to the interview the President had asserted that the elimination of nuclear arms must follow the deployment of the ABM system in outer space, while it was said during the interview that this step will precede the deployment.

Though Speakes tried to avoid giving a direct answer to this question, he ultimately had to admit that the United States is not going to scale down its offensive potential unilaterally. Thus the deputy press secretary of the White House actually disavowed the President's pronouncements. According to the N.B.C. television company, Reagan's "inaccuracy" was also admitted by other officials. The spokesman of the White House said that the United States still reserves the right to deploy the ABM system with elements of space basing, the C.B.S. television network stresses.

American journalists had a lot of questions also in connection with the President's promises to make the technology of "strategic defence" accessible to other countries, including the Soviet Union. In this connection, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan hastened to explain to the N.B.C. television company that Reagan had had in mind

another formula, namely, that the United States will not be passing on to the Soviet Union the technology of "Star Wars" until the USSR cuts drastically its nuclear arms. The president's statements and subsequent hasty "explanations" of the staff of his apparatus contradicting his own statements unwittingly give rise to the question: Who is it that decides the United States policy?

Words by Reagan that the United States has brought its troops into Grenada allegedly at the request of the government of that country were pointed out to the administration's representative at the press conference in the White House. One of the journalists said in this connection that the U.S. press heard nothing of the kind.

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CSO: 5200/1128

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS OBSERVER REJECTS U.S. FIGURES ON BOMBERS

LD021405 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1253 GMT 2 Nov 85

[By Vladimir Bogachev, TASS observer on military affairs]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Nov (TASS) -- TASS observer on military affairs, Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Disregarding the confidential character of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, reports continue to "leak" into the Western press, with references to official circles, about the proposals the United States has put forward in Geneva. In a number of cases, the information about these proposals bears a one-sided character and abounds with terminological and numerical inaccuracies hindering their evaluation. Nevertheless, on a number of issues being discussed in Geneva it is possible to form a certain picture of the U.S. position at the talks.

Thus, the UPI news agency, with a reference to officials in Washington, reports the U.S. side is proposing to reduce the numbers of heavy bombers of each side to an "equal level" of 350 units. What the U.S. side understands by "equal level" in the instance given, requires some explanation.

It is well-known that in 1979 the United States had 576 strategic bombers while the Soviet Union had 156. This fact was recorded in the appendix to the SALT II treaty and was confirmed by the signatures of the leaders of the USSR and the United States. At present, the number of such bombers on both sides is somewhat lower than 6 years ago. In implementing the replacement of B-52 bombers by new systems, the United States has been converting the old aircraft launchers of nuclear weapons to carry out auxiliary tasks.

As reported by the London Strategic Research Institute, by autumn this year the number of U.S. aircraft converted to perform "non-nuclear tasks" only amounted to 61 aircraft. The number of U.S. strategic bombers now stands at 509 units. At present, the Soviet Union has approximately 150 strategic aircraft.

According to UPI, the U.S. side in putting forward the proposal to reduce the numbers of USSR and U.S. heavy bombers to "equal levels" intends to proceed from the position that the United States now has allegedly not 509 strategic bombers, but only 260. What is more, this number includes, it is said, old U.S. aircraft "in the hangars." It emerges in accordance with the latest Pentagon calculations that in 6 years the United States has allegedly removed over 300 (!) strategic bombers from service. This is a quite improbable premise that cannot be confirmed even by the most fantastic stretching of the facts.

U.S. officials, on the other hand, are asserting that the number of Soviet strategic bombers has supposedly increased during that time to "roughly 300." The UPI agency explains this "increase" through the inclusion of Soviet "Backfire bombers" into the strategic balance, although, by the admission of the same officials from Washington, they only have a moderate range and for long-distance flights "they need to be refuelled in the air."

It is appropriate to recall that according to the SALT II treaty it is forbidden to equip "Backfire" bombers with mechanisms to refuel in the air and up to now even the most frenzied falsifiers from the Pentagon have not brought themselves to assert the USSR is violating this commitment. Incidentally, quite recently THE NEW YORK TIMES reported the Pentagon's intelligence directorate "carried out a reevaluation" of the operating range of the Soviet "Backfire" bomber. This fact, the newspaper stressed, "prompts one to query the U.S. Administration's decision to consider the "Backfire" as a part of the Soviet arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons."

The Washington administration has just not given an answer to the questions of the unlikely "reduction" of U.S. bombers over 6 years, just as it has not replied to questions about the no less fantastic data about the "growth" of the Soviet strategic air force over that same period.

Washington's manipulations of figures leads one to think that in putting forward their proposal on equal levels of long-range airplanes, the United States has no intention at all of reducing its own strategic bombers, although their number is over three times in excess of the Soviet quantity of airplanes.

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CSO: 5200/1116

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

USSR: BRITISH NOTE U.S., USSR PARITY--London--The International Institute for Strategic Studies has published a report whose conclusions refute official Washington's claims that the United States is lagging behind the USSR in the military-strategic sphere. A press release issued in connection with the report's publication states there is approximate equality between the USSR and the United States in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. [From the "Novosti" newscast; announcer read report] [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 2033 GMT 2 Nov 85 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1116

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S. NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE LEAVES YOKOSUKA

Submarine Leaves 1 Nov

LD012001 Moscow TASS in English 0836 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Tokyo, November 1 TASS -- The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine "Buffalo" has left today the port of Yokosuka, which has been turned with the blessing of the Japanese authorities into a U.S. nuclear-strategy strongpoint in the Far East. The "Buffalo" is one of the submarines equipped by the Pentagon with nuclear cruise missiles Tomahawk. As follows from the local press, the activeness of submarine missile carriers around the Japanese isles has increased this year to reach a scale unprecedented in post-war times. U.S. nuclear-powered submarines have called at the port of Yokosuka alone more than 30 times this year.

'Set a Record of Sorts'

LD020044 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT 1 Nov 85

[By TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov: "The Pentagon's Place d'Armes"]

[Text] Moscow, November 1 TASS -- By TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov.

The calls of U.S. nuclear-armed naval ships at Japanese ports have become so frequent of late that the "visit" of the nuclear-powered submarine "Buffalo" at Yokosuka which ended today would not have drawn so much attention if it had not been for some special circumstances. The point is that the U.S. submarine, like a number of other ships of the 7th U.S. Fleet, has already been armed with nuclear-tipped long-range cruise missiles. Its latest call at Yokosuka has set a record of sorts, marking an unprecedented level of activity of U.S. nuclear-armed naval ships off the coasts of Japan. This year U.S. nuclear-powered submarines called more than 30 times at Yokosuka alone.

Yokosuka, one of the largest naval bases of militarist Japan, has now become a link in the American nuclear-missile strategy in the Asian and Pacific region. But Yokosuka is not Japan's only port to which American nuclear-armed submarines and surface ships are assigned. The United States uses some other bases of the former Japanese Imperial Navy after they were appropriately modernized to meet the American demands. Sasebo is another such port. The nuclear-missile capability off the Japanese isles has been beefed up by strategic bombers based in Okinawa and [remainder of item not received]

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CSO: 5200/1117

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA: NATO 'IN CONFUSION' OVER GORBACHEV INF STANCE

PM091459 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 85 First Edition p 5

[Article by own correspondent V. Drobkov: "Confusion Within NATO"]

[Text] Brussels, 4 Oct--The new Soviet peace initiatives put forward in Paris by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev have caused confusion within NATO. In Belgium and the Netherlands specifically there has been a particular response to the Soviet leader's statement that the number of SS-20 missiles in the European part of the USSR has not increased, contrary to the repeated claims by NATO propaganda, and, furthermore, that our country is ready to set about reducing the number of those missiles. Virtually all the newspapers here carry prominent reports today about that and about the other Soviet proposals.

There has been keen debate in the Dutch parliament between supporters and opponents of beginning the deployment of new U.S. medium-range nuclear facilities in the Netherlands. During the discussion there was resolute criticism of the ambiguous stance taken by the government, which is gradually preparing to clear the way for U.S. cruise missiles in the Netherlands, so democratic forces and organizations there observe.

The Dutch parliamentarians took a decision to open special hearings on 22 October devoted to the missile problem. According to a statement by the Labor Party, the largest party in terms of deputies but now in opposition, the Soviet proposals create a new situation on the missile question and give dynamism to the Geneva talks. The Labor Party has urged the government to examine these proposals most seriously and take them into account. However, Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek has tried to belittle the Soviet initiatives' significance by claiming that they contain nothing new for the Netherlands.

The confusion within NATO is also demonstrated by a behind-the-scenes struggle on the question of calling a meeting of representatives of a number of Western countries in the near future. Initially Washington was preparing to bring together a narrow circle of the major Western powers on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit in an attempt to secure its closest allies' support for its course of whipping up the arms race in every way and extending it to space. However, this idea caused not only an adverse reaction

from France, which has refused to take part in such a meeting, but also profound resentment among the small NATO countries, which have again been left out of the "senior partners'" talks. The Belgian and Dutch foreign ministers sent the U.S. Administration a message suggesting that extraordinary meeting of NATO foreign ministers. The United States, by all accounts, jumped at this suggestion as a way of saving face after the unsuccessful attempt to round up the leading allies for an emergency meeting.

Instead of the "narrow group" meeting, initially planned for late October, there will be an extraordinary NATO foreign ministers' meeting, probably in Brussels. At that meeting, so observers here predict, Washington will try to work out a "common approach" for all the North Atlanticists to the new Soviet initiatives and proposals or, in other words, to impose the U.S. course on its partners.

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CSO: 5200/1117

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENT ON NEED FOR UK CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT

LD300034 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2008 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Commentary by Konstantin Sorokin from the "Glance at the British Scene"]

[Excerpts] The draft of an updated version of the Communist Party's Program is under discussion in the Soviet Union. It says that in the field of foreign policy Soviet Communists will be working to remove the threat of world war and establish peaceful coexistence as an incontrovertible principle of international relations.

A short time ago the Soviet Union called on the United States to slash strategic arsenals by half, to scale down the missile confrontation in Europe and to prevent any weapons, first and foremost, nuclear weapons, from being deployed in space. These proposals could help to cover part of the road to nuclear disarmament.

Needless to say, other nuclear powers can and should make their own contributions, as Britain has done in the past on many occasions. In the early sixties it played an important role in drafting the treaty banning nuclear tests in three spheres; in 1977 the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States conducted talks about a total nuclear test ban, and the British delegation showed more political realism than their American counterparts. Britain also held a constructive position when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was drafted.

At the end of November last year, the Labor Party leader, Neil Kinnock, visited Moscow. He said that once in power his party would build a national security policy on a nonnuclear basis and would order all nuclear weapons out of the country. In reply the Soviet Union invoked its 1978 pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms against states that refuse to acquire and accommodate such arms on their territory. If Britain carried out complete nuclear disarmament and dismantled all foreign nuclear bases the Soviet Union would provide a guarantee that its weapons would never be trained on British territory. The Soviet Union said it would reduce and destroy some of its medium-range missiles in Europe in reply to the reduction of British missiles. All relevant problems could be solved at bilateral talks.

The British press usually dismisses proposals of this kind as a communist ploy or Soviet propaganda. But last Saturday this point of view received a heavy blow. In London there was a 100,000-strong demonstration organized by the CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament], the largest demonstration in Europe this year. Its slogan called for a British contribution to creating a world without nuclear weapons. This has again shown that Soviet policy goals give hope to men and women who want peace and campaign for it.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET EARLY NOVEMBER COMMENTS ON NETHERLANDS DEPLOYMENT DECISION

'Contradicts Will of Majority'

LD021859 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Report by International Affairs Journalist Eduard Kovalev]

[Text] The decision by the Lubbers government giving the go-ahead to siting [razmeshcheniye] of the U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons at the Woensdrecht Base contradicts the will of the majority of Netherlanders. Such a conclusion is being made by political observers, who comment on the situation which has taken shape in the Netherlands. Indeed, about 4 million voters, almost 65 percent of their total number, have signed petitions of protest which participants of the antimissile movement have gathered for handing over to the government. Hundreds of thousands of meetings and demonstrations, which have been conducted throughout the country by progressive antiwar organizations, show the true feeling of the population. The decision by Prime Minister Lubbers is an open capitulation in the face of unprecedented pressure on the part of the United States and NATO, which the Netherlands was subject to in the course of the past few months. It contradicts the national interests of the country. This was declared by the leaders of antiwar organizations who spoke at massive meetings held on 1 November.

Lubbers and his ministers, defending their position, assert that they are ostensibly prepared to negotiate with the East on the disarmament problem. They even say that the siting of the cruise missiles allegedly will make it possible to reduce the bulk of the Netherlands' nuclear obligations to NATO. All these assertions appear clearly illogical, taking into account the practical activities of the Netherlands authorities. Millions of rank-and-file Netherlanders, members of the antiwar and the antimissile movement, believe that the decision of Lubbers' government does not oblige them to anything. The opposition political circles point out that the next parliamentary elections are to be held soon in the country, where the parties opposing the nuclear arms race will be able, provided that they win, to suspend the realization of the agreement on siting the U.S. cruise missiles. The protest movement against turning the Netherlands into Washington's nuclear hostage does not intend to stop its struggle.

'Changes Strategic Situation'

PM031415 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 85 p 3

[Report by APN correspondent A. Ignatov: "Against the Will of the People"]

[Excerpts] The Hague -- And so the Netherlands Government, giving in to powerful pressure from the United States and NATO, has taken the decision to site 48 U.S. Tomahawk nuclear missiles on the country's territory. And the opinion of millions of Dutch people? The authorities have ignored it.

The deployment of the cruise missiles changes the country's strategic situation. The nuclear means which the Netherlands possesses as a member of NATO are tactical in nature. Their range is restricted to 300 km. But the Tomahawks are strategic weapons and can be used to attack the USSR. What is more, the cruise missiles remain on Netherlands soil in alien U.S. hands. Consequently, the state's participation in military operations through somebody else's will is possible.

No, it is with good reason that local peace supporters consider the siting of the new missiles to be an anticonstitutional step. To hand over the sovereign right to declare war into alien hands is forbidden by Article 92 of the country's Fundamental Law.

It is not the right-wing liberals nor the Christian Democrats, who form the present government coalition, but the Peace Party which is currently the largest political force in the country, comprising some 3.8 million people, that is every fourth inhabitant in the country, who voted for it. According to public opinion polls, 55 percent of the population share the pacifists' views. But it seems it is not the feelings or the convictions of the majority which decide, but something completely different. So what has happened to "democracy" then?

Public Protests

LD021022 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 2 Nov 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Georgiy Alekseyev]

[Text] Under unprecedented pressure from the United States and NATO, the Netherlands ruling coalition has taken the decision to station 48 U.S. cruise missiles on Dutch soil. This was done against the will of millions of the country's citizens, which is shown by the recent events. Yesterday, while the Lubbers cabinet was meeting to examine this question, protest action against the ominous NATO plans was taking place throughout the Netherlands. About 150,000 students and schoolchildren stopped their lessons and held demonstrations on the streets of The Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Groningen, and other cities.

The day before, the government and parliament were handed a petition demanding that the stationing of the U.S. nuclear missiles be rejected. It was signed by 4 million Netherlands; in other words, almost of every three of the country's adult citizens stated their unwillingness to see the cruise death on their home soil. There have been almost daily demonstrations outside the air force base in Woensdrecht, which has been chosen by the government for the proposed stationing of the missiles. That base has become a symbol of resistance to the dangerous plans. Considering the scale that the antimissile movement in the Netherlands has assumed, there can be no doubt that the struggle by its citizens will continue.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

HESELTINE HAILS NETHERLANDS DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES

LD021221 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1203 GMT 2 Nov 85

[By chief political correspondent Chris Moncrieff]

[Text] Defence Secretary Mr Michael Heseltine today warmly welcomed the decision of the Dutch Government to deploy cruise missiles on their soil, and claimed that warnings by the Labour and Liberal Parties had now been proved devastatingly wrong. He said: "The decision completes the implementation of the NATO decision, taken in 1979, to modernise the alliance long-range theatre nuclear forces unless there was an arms control agreement which made this unnecessary.

"Events since then have proved that the elected governments and the peoples of the Western democracies were right to maintain effective deterrents."

Mr Heseltine said every attempt was made by the Labour Party, the Liberals and extreme left-wing pressure groups to undermine the will of Western governments to proceed with deployment.

"Ruthlessly they played on the fears of the civilian population. Shamelessly they inflicted the cost, disruption and inconvenience of their publicity-prone protestations on the majority of our people, who had rejected their views at the ballot box. They told us that peace in Europe would be threatened if we proceeded with deployment, to counter that already made by the Soviet Union. They said the Russians would break off the dialogue on arms control and that the process of dialogue would be at an end."

Mr Heseltine said: "One by one Western governments demonstrated their will and resolve to remain strong and to negotiate from strength rather than from weakness. Yesterday's decision in Holland completes the process. I welcome the Dutch decision. They will not regret it."

He said no claims had been dealt with more clearly and devastatingly by the march of history than those of the Labour Party, the Liberals and CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament].

"The Russians are back at the conference table and are at last conducting a serious arms control dialogue. They have responded to Western initiatives and are beginning to quantify their own proposals. This is what the resolution of NATO has achieved. It cannot be proclaimed too clearly or too often. It is that same resolution which for nearly 40 years has given to our generation a uniquely long period of peace and stability in Europe, in contrast with the appalling human misery suffered in two world wars earlier this century."

He added: "NATO, its policies and unity, have opened a new chapter of peaceful expectation in Europe."

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON BELGIAN DEMONSTRATIONS--Brussels, November 2 TASS--A demonstration of protest against the presence of U.S. cruise missiles in Belgium has taken place in front of a U.S. military base in Florennes. Contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of the Belgian population, six cruise missiles have been deployed at the base. Antiwar activists from the neighbouring Netherlands also took part in the demonstration, organized by Belgian peace campaigners. Their joint action became a manifestation of their solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of the two countries against the nuclear plans of the Pentagon and NATO imposed on them. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0935 GMT 2 Nov 85 LD]

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

BRIEFS

TASS ON OPENING OF TALKS--Stockholm, November 5 TASS--A regular session of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opened here today. S. Todorov, head of the Bulgarian delegation, called the attention of the participants in the conference to the documents of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states in Sofia, which indicate real ways of removing the nuclear threat and reversing international relations into the channel of detente. The Bulgarian representative said that the Warsaw Treaty member states stand for formulating at the Stockholm conference of substantial mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in Europe of both political and military nature. The text of the statement adopted by the Sofia conference has been distributed among the participants in the Stockholm conference. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1054 GMT 5 Nov 85 LD]

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NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS ON JAPANESE ZONES--Tokyo, November 5 TASS--638 Japanese cities, townships and vast areas, including five prefectures, have been declared nuclear-free zones, the latest issue of the bulletin of nuclear-free cities reports. The movement of Japanese cities for nuclear-free peace zones on territories subordinate to local authorities has become one of the most active forms of the country's anti-war movement. 40 percent of the Japanese now live in these zones. Anti-nuclear movement has swept hundreds of cities in the countries where the Pentagon intends to deploy or is deploying nuclear weapons. Some 400 cities in the Netherlands, 281 in Belgium, 170 in Italy, 160 in Britain and 154 in West Germany have already declared themselves nuclear-free. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 5 Nov 85 LD]

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GENERAL

ARMS SPENDING'S EFFECT ON U.S. ECONOMY VIEWED

PM241543 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Oct 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by D. Velikiy under the rubric "The Press Bears Witness": "Only to the Advantage of the Arms Magnates"]

[Text] The arms race the United States is building up is causing colossal damage to the country's economy--that is the opinion of many U.S. economic observers. This conclusion is also contained in various studies.

The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has published materials characterizing the financial aspect of Reagan's military programs as follows. In the period fiscal 1982 through fiscal 1985 Congress earmarked \$1.19 trillion for the country's militarization. This sum is 79 percent more than the total military appropriations for the preceding 4-year period. According to the budget bureau's materials it may be concluded that the growth rates of military appropriations over the past 4 years have increased from 6.2 percent in fiscal 1981 to 6.7 percent in fiscal 1985.

The total U.S. federal budget deficit for this period was \$684 billion. In other words, a considerable proportion of military appropriations has been met over these years by means of deficit financing, that is by increasing the country's internal and foreign debts which has undoubtedly had a pernicious effect on the U.S. economy and the living standard in the country.

Here is what the report from the U.S. council for economic priorities on the influence of the growth of military expenditure on the U.S. economy says:

"The arms race disrupts the country's normal economic development, focusing the bulk of state appropriations in a narrow field of industry, in particular in the transport, aerospace, radio and television, and other sectors. As a result of this 'guns instead of butter' policy the construction industry and other sectors have suffered particularly during the Reagan administration's term in office. A strong blow has been dealt to health and education."

Even a comparatively small reduction in the pace of the arms race, the report's compilers note, would have a beneficial effect on the situation in these sectors. Thus, if U.S. military expenditure since 1980 had increased by an

average not of a little over 6 percent but by 3 percent a year, the construction industry would have produced additional output worth \$2.6 billion. The ones which are most affected now--health and education--would have received an extra \$1 billion each.

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GENERAL

TASS NOTES SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

LD120018 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 11 Oct 85

[Text] Vienna 11 October TASS--Questions pertaining to ensuring peace and detente, preventing armed conflicts, a search for ways leading towards an end to the nuclear weapons race, East-West relations will be in the focus of attention of the bureau of the Socialist International and the conference on disarmament of the Socialist International which are scheduled to be held in Austria's capital on 15-17 October, Peter Jankowitsch, secretary for international issues of the Socialist Party of Austria, and Fritz Marsch, central secretary of the Socialist Party of Austria, told a press conference today. [words indistinct] at the press conference that the upcoming forum of the Socialist International is designed to contribute towards drawing up a programme of the Socialist International for disarmament and arms control. In this connection great significance attaches to the participation in the conference of representatives of states and political parties, which do not belong to the Socialist International, including the Soviet Union.

Peter Janowitsch has described the proposal prepared by the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist [word indistinct Germany on creating in Europe a zone free from chemical weapons as a "concrete step" on the way of limiting the arms race and strengthening international detente.

The participants in the session of the bureau of the Socialist International will also examine such issues as the 40th anniversary of the founding of the U.N., the situation in Latin America and the Middle East, and the present-day economic situation in the world.

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GENERAL

PHYSICS PROFESSOR BO ANDERSSON ON NUCLEAR WINTER

Stockholm TEMPUS in Swedish No 40, 1985 pp 18-21

[Article by Bo Andersson, professor of theoretical physics: "The Nuclear Winter"]

[Text] Some time ago the 40th anniversary of the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was celebrated with demonstrations as well as speeches. The speeches were usually variations of the hope of "never again." The demonstrators carried posters with demands that the major powers should immediately agree not to use nuclear weapons. But at any moment here on earth there are missiles ready to carry many times greater nuclear weapons into trajectories around the globe.

The elevators are operational in Soviet and U. S. missile silos. Below ocean surfaces and high above us submarines and aircraft are constantly ready with nuclear payloads. There are mobile intermediate-range missiles and short-range missiles ready for deployment all around Europe. In other words: the balance of terror which has been with us throughout all these years still exists as a basic strategic principle.

This means, for instance, that there are industrious people who use their entire working time to work on and think about mass destruction. The strategic targets, means and requirements are counted and recounted. The details of this scenario may change over the years. But the fundamental concept of "Whatever you can do to me, I will do to you" has not changed.

But recently President Reagan did in fact want to change the rules of the game with his proposal for SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). It is by no means certain that the technology feasible for this scenario exists either today or tomorrow. There are so many aspects of SDI, and hence the opinions of those involved differ tremendously. However, I myself find it strange that among all of those who are not directly involved in SDI or its consequences the tendency is to choose the balance of terror the way it presently is. SDI is often called Star Wars, but it could just as well have been called Star Defense.

In this article I will try to touch on something which might best be called a discussion of the unthinkable. There is a potential consequence of nuclear war which has been called nuclear winter. It should be said at the outset

that the concept is discussed among expert scientists almost as vehemently as SDI. This thought is new, and qualitatively everyone agrees that the concept has validity. But the question is how great could the effect in fact be?

The bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were small nuclear weapons and technically poor in comparison with those produced today. However, there were actually scientists on the project involving the first bombs at Los Alamos who believed there was justification for the thought that a single nuclear detonation would lead to a massive chain reaction throughout the earth's atmosphere. This did not take place, but there was sufficiently much to be horrified over anyway.

The destruction had been greater both in connection with the bombing of Tokyo and during the ensuing fire storms over Hamburg and Dresden. But here it was a matter of a single bomb and a single terrible explosion. And in addition there was that lurking uncertainty over the released radioactivity.

Initially, however, there were no worries about long-range weather changes. There were thoughts that sufficiently strong explosives might damage the ozone layer. It was known that it existed way up there at the top of the atmosphere. It protects all life from exposure to the strong ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Furthermore, one realized that such explosions would push radioactive substances to the uppermost layers of the atmosphere, where they would constitute a latent threat to the future. I will discuss those problems later on in the article. A large number of new calculations of these effects have been made that are partly based on a different strategy by the nuclear powers.

A few years ago the idea was brought up that a nuclear war could lead to long-range changes in the earth's climate. And there is risk that the changes will become such that life as we know it will become impossible on the surface of the earth.

The first time someone began to contemplate this kind of problem was when a few astronomers studied the atmosphere of the planet Mars. To their surprise they found that the temperature at the ground surface was much lower than higher up in the atmosphere in connection with the major sand storms on the planet. Somewhat later other scientists studied how volcanic eruptions might affect the climate.

And then the hypothesis was presented that the dinosaurs (and a large number of other species which disappeared "simultaneously") might have become extinct because a large comet hit the earth's surface. The actual impact might then have caused tremendous destruction, but that was said to be local. Instead, the idea was that large fires, as well as volcanic eruptions and falling comets, could fill the earth's atmosphere with small particles. Just as the sand storms whirl up dust in Mars's atmosphere, it was said that the air here on earth was filled with large amounts of small particles.

All of this was presented in written form in an article in SCIENCE, December 1983, written by R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P Ackerman, J. B. Pollack and C. Sagan (TTAPS). There were also detailed calculations which later have been at least partially confirmed by other researchers. But the reliability is low and will remain so for some time to come. This is due not only to the calculations being complicated but much more to the fact that they are based on so many uncertain assumptions.

The question is both how much matter could potentially end up in the earth's atmosphere in connection with a catastrophe, what kind of matter is involved and, finally, how such a complicated "machine" as the atmosphere reacts. How self-cleaning and stable is the air mass?

Before we begin to answer that question we will note how the earth's "external" energy budget, that is to say the radiation into and out from the earth, normally functions. The earth's surface and atmosphere are constantly absorbing solar radiation. Our part of the atmosphere, which is called the troposphere and extends up to an altitude of about 12 kilometers at our latitudes, is dense. This is why it absorbs much of the incoming radiation. It thus warms the surface and air. This heat is normally conducted upward again through heat radiation, heat transfer (convection) and various currents in the air.

The heat gradually radiates back out into space. But in practice we are "borrowing" this energy for some time and that sustains all of life down here. Since the intensity of the heat radiation varies rapidly (as the fourth power) with temperature, both the atmosphere and the surface temperature adapt rapidly. This is why the balance remains stable and the radiation energy circulates in the system and out again at an even pace.

But without a suitably composed atmosphere this borrowed time changes in one or the other direction. There are substances in the air which are active in the absorption of heat radiation but which on the other hand are essentially transparent to the visible sunlight. This applies primarily to water, in the form of ice crystal droplets, vapor and carbon dioxide. If, for example, large quantities of carbon dioxide were added, the atmosphere would function much more like a blanket for the outflowing heat radiation. Thus, both the surface and the air layers closest to the surface become warmer.

But if, on the other hand, some substance were to be added to the atmosphere which prevented the influx of sunlight--without simultaneously preventing the outflow of heat radiation--precisely the opposite effect would be achieved. Assume that a large part of the solar radiation were to be absorbed high up in the atmosphere, at the same time as the surface continued to send its radiation upward. Then the surface would rapidly become cooler. And the cooling would continue until a new equilibrium were reached, in which the heat radiation upward becomes equal to the radiation downward. This is probably exactly what happens in Mars's atmosphere when sand storms hurl a great deal of small dust particles high up in the air. And it is in this manner that comet impacts and a potential nuclear war might be able to create long-range climatic changes and freeze everything.

The size of this climatic effect is sensitive to many different factors. In calculating it, it is necessary first to find out how many nuclear weapons and what types of weapons might conceivably be used. It is necessary to find out how much dust and matter could potentially be thrown up and how large the fires which are created. It is necessary to determine the composition of the dust and what kind of soot is created. It is necessary to determine the altitude at which all of this is deposited and how long it could conceivably remain there. And not until then it is possible to start contemplating what temperature and wind conditions, rain and other climatic conditions might look like. In fact, not even that is sufficient, because it is also necessary to think about whether the new condition might last more than a few days or weeks or whether the fact is that the earth's atmosphere in some sense rapidly becomes self-cleaning.

All of these questions are difficult to answer because they in turn depend on unknown phenomena. Of course, it feels almost unnatural to discuss how the major powers might deploy their nuclear weapons, but unfortunately it is necessary to start at this point in order to obtain some fundamental facts for the continuation [of the discussion]. According to what is known from public accounts, the major powers might deploy such weapons for both strategic targets, such as population centers (called "soft targets" in the jargon) and enemy fortifications ("hard targets") and for tactical purposes such as directly against invading troops.

I will return to the radioactivity problems later on. But it is clear that in certain cases (such as with the neutron bomb) the desire is to use the possibility of striking living "targets" and preserving for example buildings and roads etc. The destruction can be regulated by using nuclear weapons with more or less radiation as well as by allowing the weapons to explode near ground level or high up in the air. In that respect for example 300-400 meters are "close" for a 100-kiloton explosive, but twice or triple that altitude is close to the ground for a megaton bomb. Ground level detonations are "dangerous" in the sense that they necessarily throw a great deal of matter high into the atmosphere. It is to be expected that such explosions will be used against hard targets, while perhaps the soft targets will be attacked with both air and surface level bursts.

There are more than 1,400 missile silos in the USSR and about 1,000 in the continental United States. And in both places there are large numbers of air fields, submarine bases and underground command centers. All of these are hard targets. TTAPS and other groups have studied a long series of potential scenarios of nuclear weapons combat. The consequences of for example a 100-megaton counterattack against pure population centers, a 3,000-megaton direct attack against missile bases as well as a full-scale nuclear war in which all available resources are used on both sides against all conceivable targets have been considered.

For each of these potential scenarios it is necessary to determine how much matter might end up in the atmosphere. One must furthermore find out both how it is composed and where it will end up. All of this depends on the landscape

where the nuclear weapons might be deployed, that is to say on the composition of the soil and on the amount of combustible material.

And what happens if several weapons are exploded within the same area? It is obvious that a city cannot burn more than once, for instance. But a megaton bomb detonated near the ground will dig a crater hundreds of meters in diameter and throw several million tons of dust into the atmosphere.

Of this dust the infamous mushroom cloud will pull with it more than half a million tons high up into the atmosphere, according to reliable calculations. For a megaton bomb the cloud will not stabilize until high above the troposphere and several tens of thousands of tons might very well be deposited in the next layer, called the stratosphere. A 100-kiloton explosive, on the other hand, will not reach appreciably above the troposphere.


This particular border is important, because particles which end up all the way into the stratosphere will continue to flow around the earth for a long time.

In the lower layers of the atmosphere such particles are generally "washed" away relatively quickly and the "lifetime" of dust particles in those layers usually last days or at most weeks. In other words, they rain away. Stratospheric cleaning, on the other hand, takes place mainly when the particles are pulled downward by gravity or to a lesser extent through exchange downward by means of air currents. It could therefore take years before particles deposited as high as that were to disappear again.

But if one now has some idea of the quantity of material involved and where it ends up, then there is the next question. And that concerns the composition of the particles and their densities. It is particularly important to determine the size of the particles and their chemical composition. In order for the heat radiation upward to be halted it is necessary that the particles be at least as large as a normal wavelength for infrared radiation, in other words, about one-hundredth of a mm or 10 microns. Thus, if the particles are smaller than 10 microns they are "dangerous."

They will then affect the incoming radiation by absorbing or diffusing it back but they will let through the heat radiation from below. For certain substances such as soot particles even the larger ones are dangerous in that respect. Fortunately, soot is one of the few substances which stop light much more than they absorb heat.

If a certain kind of particle with a given density and layer thickness prevents for example half of the incoming light radiation, a layer twice as thick will stop three-fourths, that is to say the particle layers affect the insolation exponentially. What happens is not only that the radiation is absorbed by the small particles, but also that an increasing portion is diffused back out into space. Under normal conditions the atmosphere absorbs about one-fourth of the radiation and diffuses back another fourth. The earth's surface, on the other hand, absorbs 45 percent and reflects the last five percent. Overall, well over 60 percent of the sunlight is therefore utilized on the surface and in its immediate surrounding.



Key: 1. Altitude (km)

2. Time after detonation (days)

The amount of debris which a 5,000-megaton nuclear war would add to the atmosphere, according to TTAPS, would radically alter these conditions. The upper layers of the atmosphere where the dust ends up would then take care of 90-95 percent of the incoming sunlight. And then we and all other life here on the surface and in its surroundings would have to be content with perhaps 5 percent, that is to say not quite one-tenth of what we normally have available. Now it will get cold down here!

This is illustrated in the adjacent figure, which I have taken from TTAPS's calculations. On one axis we see the period after a 5,000-megaton nuclear war calculated in days. On the other axis is the altitude above the ground and the whole plot applies to the continents of the northern hemisphere, where both we and the majority of the developed industrial nations are located. We also see various lines in the figure. They represent the change in temperature. We see, for example, that from about 30 to 90 days after the war the temperature will increase by about 90 degrees C at an altitude of 18-20 kilometers. At the same time the temperature down at ground level has decreased by 20-30 degrees. Not until nearly 4 months later has the drop in temperature decreased to less than 10 degrees down here! And based on these

calculations it will probably be years before the temperature changes will return to normal down here on the surface, according to TTAPS.

Now, how much are these calculations to be believed? Well, I have already mentioned that there are lots of unknowns in this context. For instance, we have little knowledge about what happens during really large and violent fires (perhaps luckily?). It is known that large forest fires, which quite frequently take place in North America, can lead to smoke and dust particles rising as high as 5 and 6 kilometers into the atmosphere. According to reports, large fires in cities have led to pollution at even higher altitudes, all the way up toward the stratosphere.

The explosion of a nuclear weapon naturally causes fires in the vicinity. The first explosive flash represents about one-third of the total energy which is released and it has a light spectrum comparable to solar radiation. It is so strong that it might be expected that fires will start up to 10 kilometers or more from a 1-megaton detonation at an altitude of about 1 kilometer. After that comes the shock wave and it can be expected to "blow out" some of these fires but also to start new ones through the destruction in its wake, such as gas pipelines and oil storage tanks. It is anticipated that such an explosion will create tremendous fires up to 50-100 square kilometers in magnitude.

In an urban environment this could lead to fire storms such as were caused by the bombing attacks of World War II. And that means violent air movements with hurricane-like winds, large heat tornadoes and cyclones. In an urban environment there are also many chemical substances from plastics or from modern construction materials, which in the fires could produce all kinds of toxic material and all kinds of small particles.

Here we meet one of the most controversial parts of the discussion about the nuclear winter. TTAPS have estimated the amount of smoke and soot particles to about 100 million tons in connection with a "large" nuclear war. Other investigators have varied between one-tenth and two to three times greater amounts. And this factor of 10 to 30 means the difference between a major disturbance of the atmosphere and a rather insignificant change! The calculations of the size of the disturbance also depend greatly on the assumptions made concerning the dispersion of these tremendous clouds of pollution. For once they have been placed in the atmosphere they will spread under the effect of the winds.

Both TTAPS and most other groups discussing the effects have imagined that the smoke clouds spread in an even manner across the sky with a center somewhere in the middle of the northern hemisphere. Further, it was envisioned that the atmosphere in general would remain as it presently is. It is entirely possible that the clouds of smoke will gather and become denser in some areas and thin out in other places. Furthermore, it is perhaps conceivable that great changes will occur both in wind and air pressure as the temperature changes. Some of these changes will reinforce the effects but others will weaken them.

A very obvious problem is how the large oceans will affect such scenarios. We know that water has great capacity for heat, that is to say it retains heat much better than what for example air and most other gases can. The first 100 meters of water in the sea in fact contain more heat than do the continents and the mass of air above the continents. This is why the seas will cool much more slowly than the air and ground of the continents. This means that there will be great temperature differences between the air above the sea and the air over land. As a result, violent air movements are to be expected and thus in all likelihood severe storms. This effect is very difficult to calculate.

Sagan--one of the members of the TTAPS group--has published a detailed description of what the nuclear winter scenario might mean from a policy aspect (FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1983/84 pp 257-292). He believes that the group's calculations may be fundamental to a change in the balance of armaments. With surprising optimism he is of the opinion that it should be possible to define an upper limit for deploying a nuclear weapon so that long-range climatic effects cannot occur. His limits are at a level which was already exceeded during the 1950's by both major powers!

Sagan thus envisions that a certain given amount of smaller nuclear weapons--for instance in the 100-kiloton range--is scarcely able to force up enough damaging small particles into the stratosphere in order to start a nuclear winter. But instead it must probably be said that they would create a miserable situation from the aspect of radioactivity here on earth, because the fact that the residue from an explosion ends up in the troposphere means that the short-lived radioactive substances will also create a great deal of damage here on the surface of the earth. A very large bomb in the megaton range is estimated to leave only a fraction of a percent of its radioactive content here in the troposphere, while a 10-kiloton bomb according to the same calculations is likely to leave about 80 percent here.

If the radioactive substances end up in the stratosphere, in general they have time to decay, except as regards strontium-90 and cesium-137. Other than that, the risks of the very damaging gamma radiation can be eliminated with great certainty. However, this cannot be assumed in connection with the radioactivity from "small" bombs. That will probably be spread in a rather broad band around the earth and affect everything contained within the band with lethal fallout.

These facts were developed in another context by the World Health Organization and the U. S. Department of Defense. The fact is that both major powers--for tactical as well as strategic reasons--have reduced their offensive explosives quite considerably over the last few years. The Titan missiles of the United States, and even the more recent intercontinental Minuteman II missiles, had explosives in the range of 2-10 megatons. The Soviet equivalents, the SS-18 and SS-19, even had 20 and 5 megaton warheads, respectively. The development of missiles which contain several warheads and have greater accuracy, has reduced the size of the weapons quite dramatically. The Minuteman III has 170-kiloton explosives and the Poseidon approximately 50-kiloton explosives. The Soviet Union is probably somewhat behind the United States, but according

to information a growing number of its missiles are armed with warheads in the range of a few hundred kilotons.

This has caused the World Health Organization to point out that all beings in the northern hemisphere nowadays risk a more than 10-fold increase in radioactive dosage in comparison with 1975 in case of a major nuclear war. This damage will also be of a long-range nature, that is to say a significantly increased risk of cancer and major genetic damage.

Another very great problem is the risk of attacks on nuclear power plants. The number of such industries in operation has increased significantly in recent years although the planning trend has obviously changed so that few plants are under construction or under planning at the present. The reason for such an attack in itself being so much worse than an "ordinary" attack is that long-lived radioactive isotopes are constantly being stored in a nuclear power plant. In comparing the amount of radiation released by a megaton bomb and a gigawatt-producing reactor demolished by explosion, one will find that after 1 hour the fallout from the reactor is only 1 percent of the fallout from the bomb. But after 3 days it is nearly half, after 1 week just as great and after 1 year nearly 15 times greater.

I will not discuss more horrible things now. All of us probably agree that a nuclear war and its consequences are something we would like not to have to contemplate too much.

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